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I. INTRODUCTION
Given the “third wave” of democratic development and entrenchment 
that has taken hold around the world within the past three decades,1 the 
topic of how these transitioning societies cope with the legacy of atrocity
and criminality that often accompany authoritarian rule has taken on a
1. See  SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Univ. of Okla. Press 1991). 
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fresh salience.  The structural, ethical, legal, and political problems faced
during such transitions have become the topic of a burgeoning
“transitional justice” sub-field within Law and Political Science. This 
Article will survey the key episodes of transitional justice in various 
countries since the 1970s, and then apply the lessons gleaned to the 
transition of Serbia2 during the first five years following the deposition 
of authoritarian ruler Slobodan Milošević in October 2000, and the 
subsequent establishment of democratic rule. The Serbian case of 
transitional justice, especially its first five years (2000–2005), is 
important because it demonstrates how the issue of accountability for
past crimes within a society can often butt up against concerns over 
political stability in a country that is attempting to consolidate its new 
democracy.  The way in which the process of transitional justice is
undertaken in such environments raises questions that move beyond 
simply legal, and indeed, moral concerns over “justice” and “right versus
wrong,” and instead raises more context specific concerns of 
institutional design and political stability.  This Article will show that 
the empirical evidence demonstrates that the outcome of the transitional 
justice process a country undertakes, upon its political stability, needs to
be taken into account when fashioning said process.  There needs to
exist some sort of common understanding between the various parties 
involved as to the procedures and the extent to which transitional justice 
will be undertaken.  This argument takes away nothing from those who
would cite to the necessity of holding accountable those who have 
committed past crimes, but rather argues that this noble concern over
justice needs to be equally balanced with an understanding of the 
2. The following should be noted: The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) was formed in 1945 and contained the six constituent republics of Serbia, Montenegro, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia.  In 1991–1992, Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia declared their independence from the SFRY, leaving
only Serbia and Montenegro within the union, which they promptly reorganized (into a 
looser federal structure) and renamed as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).  In
2003, Serbia and Montenegro dissolved the FRY and replaced it with the State–Union of
Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) which was supposed to act as an even looser confederation,
but in reality served as a vehicle for the de facto independence of both republics.  Actual 
independence was achieved by both republics in late 2006 when the SCG was dissolved.
This Article surveys the transitional justice process within Serbia during the 2000–2005
period.  Although technically not an independent country and instead part of first the FRY,
and then later the SCG, during this time period, the republic of Serbia was independent 
and quite separate from its sister republic of Montenegro in everything but name (with its
own separate customs borders, currency, and judicial or political institutions).
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political realities facing newly transitioning states.  The points made
here are not normative, but rather focus on the empirical question of 
what variable(s) ensure the success of the transitional justice processes a 
country may undertake. As the Serbian case of transitional justice during
2000–2005 shall demonstrate, if the balance between the need for justice 
and the desire for stability are not met, the result shall be a situation 
where both justice and stability suffer. 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), formed in
1945, was a multi-ethnic state made up of six constituent republics: 
Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia.
For much of its history, the country was ruled by the Communist dictator 
Josip Broz Tito.3  With Tito’s death in 1980, the one unifying national 
leader that was essential for dealing with the financial collapse the
country faced in the mid-1980s (as a result of not being able to pay its 
international debt) was no longer on the scene.  In the first multi-party 
election allowed in the country in 1989–1990, nationalist politicians (not 
wedded at all to the idea of Yugoslavia) came to power in the republics 
of Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia.  By 
1991–1992, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia had
declared their independence from the SFRY (leaving only the republics
of Serbia and Montenegro remaining within Yugoslavia). While the
nationalist President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, was willing to allow 
Slovenia and Macedonia to leave Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, with their significant ethnic Serb minority populations, 
were not accorded the same privilege.  The resulting civil war lasted
until 1995 with numerous atrocities and war crimes committed by all 
sides. Realizing the value of the domestic organized criminal syndicates
within Serbia, Milošević ceded large portions of the Serbian economy to 
the Serbian mafia in an effort to bust the United Nations (U.N.) 
sanctions that had been imposed on the country, and at the same time 
recruited their members to serve in his security services and fight in the 
civil war. Responding to the murderous excesses of this conflict, the 
U.N. Security Council, in 1993, established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)4 to judge serious breaches of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
3. See generally JOHN R. LAMPE, YUGOSLAVIA AS HISTORY (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2000) (1996), for an excellent detailed history of Yugoslavia from the early 20th
Century up until the late 1990s. 
4. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the ICTY 
under the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers, and determining that ethnic cleansing in the
former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security) [hereinafter
ICTY].
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Yugoslavia.5  Eventually, not only Milošević, but also a vast segment of 
the Serbian security and defense establishment found themselves either
under investigation or under indictment by the ICTY.  Within Serbia 
itself, even after the end of the civil war in 1995, Milošević continued to 
use the Serbian mafia to staff his security services and buttress his
power. With the end of Milošević’s rule in October 2000, the democratic 
opposition that took power found itself faced with the need to hold 
accountable the organized crime figures within the security services that
had committed so many crimes both during the civil war and its 
aftermath, but in a way that would preserve the fragile political stability 
of the country.
The transitional justice mechanism the Government of Serbia adopted 
to address the crimes committed during Slobodan Milošević’s authoritarian 
rule was to establish, in 2003, two specialized domestic courts—with 
accompanying independent prosecutorial offices—to investigate war
crimes and organized crimes committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. Through an examination of these specialized portions of
the judicial branch of the Republic of Serbia, specifically the War
Crimes Chamber of the Belgrade District Court (Special Court for War 
Crimes)—including its independent Prosecutor’s Office—and the
Organized Crime Chamber of the Belgrade District Court (Special Court 
for Organized Crime)—including its independent Prosecutor’s Office,
up until 2005—this Article shall demonstrate how these judicial
agencies eventually achieved near-complete structural autonomy from 
the Government of Serbia.  In achieving this autonomy, these agencies
were no longer embedded within the domestic Serbian political process and
transformed instead into purely independent political actors.  Structurally 
autonomous and no longer answering to the same constituency as the 
Government of Serbia, the Special Courts for War Crimes and 
Organized Crime came to develop their own public policy objectives 
that were in stark contrast to the stated goals and objectives of the
Serbian Government. By the close of 2005, the ensuing political battle 
had directly resulted in an open feud between the Serbian Government 
and the Special Courts, during which the Special Courts found the Serbian
5. Note that in this context we are referring to the pre-1992 Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) which consisted of all five of its now independent 
successor states, not the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) which was formed 
in 1992 by the former constituent republics of Serbia and Montenegro. 
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Government blocking their attempts to bring criminal perpetrators to
justice. The Serbian Government found the Special Courts (through
their actions to bring such perpetrators to justice) threatening the fragile
political stability of the state. 
Part II of this Article will survey the various episodes of transitional
justice throughout the world since the 1970s.  The purpose of this survey
is to formulate and then present a typology illustrating the wide range of 
available transitional justice mechanisms for societies dealing with the 
legacies of atrocity and criminality in the wake of a transition.  Through 
an analysis of the typology, it will become clear that in order for a 
country’s transitional justice process to achieve some measure of 
success, there needs to exist some sort of common understanding 
between the various parties involved as to the procedures and the extent 
to which transitional justice will be undertaken.  Part III of this Article 
shall present a brief historical background of the mass atrocities and
crimes that were committed in Serbia during the rule of Slobodan 
Milošević. Part IV of this Article will offer a general description of the 
Serbian legal system during the 2000–2005 period, as well as an in-
depth description of the specialized judicial institutions created in 2003 
to address the need for transitional justice in Serbia due to the atrocities 
and crimes committed during Milošević’s rule of the country.  Part V of 
this Article shall explore the work of Serbia’s specialized judicial 
institutions up until 2005 and offer an assessment of the institutional
factors that led to their inability to bring criminal perpetrators to justice 
and indeed threaten the fragile political stability of the state (through
their actions). Part VI of this Article will return to the typology of
transitional justice episodes and mechanisms presented in Part II and test
the proposition gleaned from that typology (i.e. that in order for the 
transitional justice process undertaken by a country to achieve some 
measure of success, there needs to exist some sort of common
understanding between the various parties involved as to the procedures 
and the extent to which transitional justice will be undertaken) against 
the Serbian case (c. 2000–2005). 
II. A SURVEY OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE EPISODES
Since the late 1970s, a wave of scholarship studying how societies 
transitioning from authoritarian rule can cope with the legacy of atrocity 
and criminality committed during the previous regime has emerged. 
Through a survey of these episodes, a picture can begin to be pieced
together of the various mechanisms for transitional justice available to
newly transitioning states.  As shall be seen, the picture that emerges in 
any transition situation is one in which two variables are always present. 
176
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The first variable is whether there exists a “pact” of some kind between
the old authoritarian regime and the new regime dealing with the 
administration of justice for any crimes that may have been committed
in the past. The second variable deals with the specific type of legal 
institution which is tasked with holding the old authoritarian regime
perpetrators accountable. Through exploring both of these variables in 
detail, a typology illustrating the wide range of available transitional 
justice mechanisms can be presented. 
A. The Concept and Existence of the “Pact” 
The concept of a “pact” between old and new regimes in democratic
transitions is nothing new.  Within the sub-field of comparative politics 
in Political Science, numerous scholars have explored the negotiation 
process or “pact-making” that goes on between soft-line elements of 
authoritarian regimes and democratic oppositions in order to arrange an 
orderly transition where at least some of the priorities and concerns of 
the old regime will be taken into account.6 
This traditional concept of “pact making” used by comparative politics 
scholars is quite different however from the way the term will be 
conceptualized here, in the context of transitional justice.  The pact-
making comparative politics scholars refer to is a broad formalized
process where old and new regime elements come to explicit 
understandings regarding a comprehensive range of issues dealing with
post-transition governance—everything from the distribution of power 
within the new regime to social compacts between various public and
private economic groups (organized business, labor, etc.) and the state.7 
The idea of pact-making in the transitional justice context presented 
here, on the other hand, is a much more focused concept.  Here, the term
refers to whether there exists some type of common understanding
between the old and new regimes regarding the procedures and extent 
6. See, e.g., GUILLERMO O’DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 
(John Hopkins Univ. Press 1993) (1986); HUNTINGTON, supra note 1; Terry Lynn Karl, 
Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, in TRANSITIONS TO
DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTHERN EUROPE (Geoffrey Pridham 
ed., 1995).
7. Terry Lynn Karl, Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America, 23 COMP.
POL. 1, 9–11 (1990). 
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through which transitional justice will be undertaken.  The use of the 
language “common understanding” is deliberate here.  While pact-
making in the transitional justice context can take the form of a written
negotiated document (or series of documents) between the old and new 
regimes, it can also be much less formal.  Indeed, the existence of a
“pact” in the transitional justice context does not necessarily imply that 
old regime elements joined the new regime in negotiating it—as will be 
seen, pacts can be imposed by the new regime upon elements of the old 
if the new regime is strong enough to do so. 
1. Negotiated Pacts 
a. Negotiated Prior to Transition 
These pacts are the result of negotiations between the authoritarian
regime and the democratic opposition waiting in the wings prior to the 
actual regime transition. The results of these negotiations can take several 
forms.
In the case of Spain’s transition (c. 1975–1979) out of the authoritarian 
Franco Regime, the transition process was initiated by Francisco
Franco’s death in 1975.  The succeeding government, headed by the 
newly crowned King Juan Carlos I and Prime Minister Adolopho Suarez 
Gonzalez, sought to establish a common understanding between both 
Francoist and opposition groups regarding the administration of 
transitional justice in the new transition Regime.  Prime Minister Suarez 
Gonzalez sought this common understanding through negotiations on
two fronts: with the Military authorities on the one hand and opposition 
political parties on the other. Obtaining the agreement of the Military 
authorities was important; the Military high command was loyal to the 
Francoist political system and thus in a position to seriously influence 
(for better or worse) the transition process.8  In September 1976, Prime 
Minister Suarez Gonzalez, with the assistance of King Juan Carlos I,
was able to obtain the support of the Military high command through a
guarantee that, in any future regime, the Military authorities would not
be purged and instead remain in place, with any future reforms to the 
Military following the established legal principles.9  As with the Military, 
obtaining the agreement of the opposition parties was also key, as the
 8. Paloma Aguilar, Justice, Politics, and the Memory of the Spanish Transition, 
in THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN DEMOCRATIZING SOCIETIES 106– 
08 (Alexandra Barahona de Brito et al. eds., 2001). 
9. Jose Maria Maravall & Julian Santamaria, Political Change in Spain and the 
Prospects for Democracy, in  TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: SOUTHERN
EUROPE 71 (Guillermo O’Donnell et al. eds., 1986). 
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opposition parties (especially the Communists) were very adept at 
mobilizing their supporters into public protests and strikes.10  Prior to the 
multi-party June 1977 elections, Prime Minister Suarez Gonzalez was 
able to negotiate the entry of the opposition parties into the (formerly)
one-party political system in exchange for them dropping any demands 
for the future prosecution of Francoist era political and military
authorities for atrocities and crimes committed by the old Regime.11  The
culmination of these negotiated pacts with the Military and opposition 
parties was the ratification, in October 1977 by the newly elected
democratic parliament, of a “full-stop” amnesty law that prevented any
trials of members of the old Francoist Regime.12 
In the case of South Africa’s transition (c. 1991–1995) out of the 
authoritarian Apartheid Regime of the Afrikaner dominated National
Party (NP), the transition process was initiated by the NP Government
itself—which set out to negotiate a gradual transition with the opposition 
African National Congress (ANC)—starting in 1990 when the ANC was 
unbanned and its leader, Nelson Mandela, released from prison. The 
following year, multi-party talks between the NP and ANC began.
Negotiations, which dragged on for two years, hinged on the ANC’s 
demand for free and multi-party elections and the NP’s desire to secure a 
position for itself in the new post-Apartheid South Africa (a desire that 
was tied in large part to an amnesty for the apartheid era political crimes 
committed by the NP Government and its supporters).13 In 1993 an
agreement was reached on an interim Constitution which, in its epilogue,
contained a provision for “National Unity and Reconciliation” that
established the basis for amnesty for political crimes (i.e. those committed 
on behalf of or in furtherance of the Regime) committed during the
Apartheid era. Following multi-party elections in 1994, the new ANC-
led Government set out to put the amnesty provision of the 1993 Interim 
Constitution in place through the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act.14  Section 3 of the Act established an amnesty
10. Id. at 84.
11. Id. 
12. Aguilar, supra note 8, at 102–03. 
13. Richard A. Wilson, Justice and Legitimacy in the South Africa Transition, in
THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN DEMOCRATIZING SOCIETIES 193–94
(Alexandra Barahona de Brito et al. eds., 2001). 
14. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=71008 (last visited Sept. 21, 2009). 
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scheme whereby, in exchange for a full recounting of the facts, a person 
that had committed politically motivated apartheid era crimes could 
receive amnesty.
b. Negotiated in the Midst of the Transition 
These pacts are the result of negotiations between the new democratic
regime in power, and elements of the former authoritarian regime at
some point after the actual democratic regime transition. 
In the case of Argentina’s initial transition (c. 1983–1987) out of the 
authoritarian Military Junta that had ruled the country since taking 
power in 1976, the transition process was initiated by the Junta’s loss of 
popular support following Argentina’s 1982 defeat in the Falklands War. 
The speed at which the Junta fell from power, coupled with the complete 
collapse of its public support, left little opportunity for the Junta to 
negotiate a transitional justice pact with the opposition (which itself was 
divided).15  The succeeding democratic government of President Raul
Alfonsin proceeded to begin pursuing transitional justice through active 
prosecutions of high level Military officers, which culminated in the trial
and conviction of five of the original nine Junta leaders (two of which, 
General Videla and Admiral Massera, were sentenced to life imprisonment).16 
The general dissatisfaction within the officer corps unleashed by this
process led to discontent in the military ranks when more junior officers 
began to be targeted for prosecution.17 Although the Alfonsin 
Government tried to mollify these dissatisfied elements in the Military 
through The Full Stop Law in December 1986 (which put a thirty day 
time limit on filing future criminal prosecutions), the Military was still
not appeased.18  The culmination of this general dissatisfaction within
the Military, especially amongst the more junior officers, was a military 
uprising during Easter of 1987 led by Lt.-Col. Aldo Rico.  The demands 
of the rebelling officers, which included full amnesty (for crimes
committed during the Junta’s Regime) and the suspension of current
trials, were negotiated directly with President Alfonsin himself (who met 
with the rebelling officers personally), and soon put into effect by the 
Alfonsin Government.  Current trials were suspended, and in June 1987 
15. LUIS RONIGER & MARIO SZNAJDER, THE LEGACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
THE SOUTHERN CONE: ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND URUGUAY 56–58 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
16. Kathryn Sikkink & Carrie Booth Walling, Argentina’s Contribution to Global
Trends in Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 306–07 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena
eds., 2006).
17. Id. 
18. RONIGER & SZNAJDER, supra note 15, at 69–70. 
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when the Government submitted an amnesty law (The Law of Due 
Obedience) to the Argentine Congress, the Congress, feeling under
pressure by the Military, passed it.19 The law granted all military officers 
with the rank of Lt.-Col. and below amnesty for any human rights
violations committed during the Junta’s Regime.20 The status quo 
provided by The Full Stop Law and The Law of Due Obedience would 
remain in effect in Argentina until 2003.21 
2. Imposed Pacts 
Unlike the negotiated pacts described above, these pacts are not the
result of negotiations between authoritarian regimes and their democratic
oppositions.  Rather, these pacts are imposed by one party over the other. 
This usually occurs when one party (either the old regime or democratic 
opposition) has significantly more power over the other, and can consequently
impose its desired pact—outlining the extent of the transitional justice 
process. The weaker party, although not necessarily satisfied with the 
pact, being in the weaker position has no choice but to accept it. 
a. Imposed by Old Regime 
In the case of Chile’s initial transition (c. 1989–1999) out of the 
authoritarian Pinochet Regime, the transition process was initiated by
Augusto Pinochet’s voluntary resignation from power in 1989 (after 
losing a plebiscite on the prolongation of his rule). Dictating the 
transition process from a position of strength, the Pinochet Regime 
placed several key constraints on the succeeding democratically elected
government of President Patricio Aylwin to pursue transitional justice. 
These constraints consisted of the following: (1) the 1980 Constitution 
promulgated by the Regime and the “authoritarian enclaves” contained 
19. Id. at 91–94. 
20. Id. 
21. It should be noted however that The Full Stop Law and The Law of Due
Obedience were later found not to apply to the kidnappings and identity charges of the 
children of leftist activists disappeared by the Regime.  Also it should be noted that in a
1995 decision, the Argentine Federal Court of Appeals held that although The Full Stop
Law and The Law of Due Obedience precluded criminal prosecutions, they did not prevent 
judicial investigations and court proceedings in order to ascertain the truth of what
happened to murdered or disappeared people.  See Sikkink & Walling, supra note 16, at 
314–16. 
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within it; (2) the 1978 Amnesty Law that had been passed by the Regime;
and (3) the fact that the Chilean judiciary was still staffed by members 
appointed by the old Regime.  The first constraint, the 1980 Constitution,
was riddled with so-called “authoritarian enclaves” that severely
curtailed the powers of the new Alywin Government. The Military 
enjoyed its own budget, separate from that of the state, and autonomous
from state oversight; the Military had the power to appoint Senators to
the Chilean Congress’ upper house;22 and the Military’s National
Security Council (composed of the Heads of the various Armed Force
Branches) placed the military in a position to monitor the actions of the 
civilian administration.23  The second constraint, the 1978 Amnesty Law, 
had granted a “full-stop” pardon to all state security officials that had 
committed crimes between September 1973 and March 1978.24  The  
third and final constraint was the fact that the judiciary was filled with 
Pinochet-era appointees, which meant that the Alywin Government was 
faced with a judicial branch that had cooperated with the Military during 
the old Regime and were thus loath to act against it now that the Regime 
had been replaced.25  Responding to a challenge to the 1978 Amnesty 
Law’s constitutionality, the Chilean Supreme Court ruled in August 
1990 that the Law was indeed constitutional—quashing any pending
investigations.26  Unable to amend or override the 1978 Amnesty Law
because of the blocking power of the military-conservative dominated
Chilean Senate, and stymied by the courts, the Alywin Government 
found its options for transitional justice constrained by the structures the 
previous Pinochet Regime had put in place to protect its interests. 
b. Imposed by New Regime 
In the case of Rwanda’s initial transition (c. 1994–present) out of the 
ethnically Hutu-dominated Regime of Juval Habyarimana, the transition 
was initiated by the Hutu Regime’s military defeat (following its 
estimated massacre of 500,000 to 800,000 ethnic Tutsi Rwandans, as 
well as sympathetic Hutus) by the Tutsi dominated rebel group, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Owing to the fact that its political
position had been assured by its military strength, the new RPF
Government was able to dictate the process through which transitional 
22. Which, together with the conservative Senators within that chamber, gave the 
conservative forces in the country the power to block any legislation that they did not like. 
23. RONIGER & SZNAJDER, supra note 15, at 91–94. 
 24. David Pion-Berlin, The Pinochet Case and Human Rights Progress in Chile: Was 
Europe a Catalyst, Cause or Inconsequential?, 36 J. LAT AM. STUD. 479, 483 (2004). 
25. RONIGER & SZNAJDER, supra note 15, at 95–96. 
26. Pion-Berlin, supra note 24, at 494. 
182
BAKER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2009 9:36 AM    
  























   
   
   




[VOL. 11:  171, 2009] The Serbian Case
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
justice would be undertaken in Rwanda.  The new Regime’s former 
adversaries, owing to their military defeat, had no choice but to accept
the pact if they wished to return to Rwanda (from the crowded refugee 
camps in eastern Congo many had fled to) and resume their lives.  The 
pact the RPF imposed was one in which returning Hutu combatants
would have to attend Ingando Camps.27  These camps served to promote
Hutu-Tutsi reconciliation through indoctrinating their participants with
RPF propaganda.28  The Ingando Camps run for returning combatants
lasted from several weeks into months, and were a condition for the 
discharge of ex-combatants into society.29 Once discharged, ex-
combatants were given aid packets (containing household supplies, 
transport to one’s home village, and food rations).30  The majority of
lecturers at Ingando Camps were RPF Government representatives—the 
lectures themselves consisting of how the mentality of the previous Hutu
Government was mistaken, how the ethnic distinctions between Hutu
and Tutsi were colonial era inventions, and how the RPF Government 
was achieving great things for the country.31  Participation in Ingando 
Camps was the imposed condition the RPF Government placed on its 
former Hutu adversaries who wished to re-integrate into Rwandan
society.
3. Absent or Broken Pacts
As was the case in Argentina during its initial transition (c. 1983– 
1987), there can be situations where transitional justice pacts between
old and new regime elements are absent. There can also be cases,
however, where previously implemented pacts are broken. 
In the case of Argentina after 2003, the democratic Government of
President Nestor Kirchner was able to break the transitional justice pact
negotiated between the Alfonsin Government and the Military in 1987 
with the promulgation of The Law of Due Obedience. Relying on an 
argument couched in international law (the Kirchner Government had
27. Note that while here only the experiences of Hutu ex-combatants at Ingando
Camps is discussed, Ingando Camps were not only reserved for Hutu ex-combatants.  All 
Rwandan citizens were expected to attend these camps at some point in their lives.
28. Chi Mgbako, Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination 
in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 201, 202 (2005). 
29. Id. at 209–10. 
30. Id. at 210–11, n.72. 
31. Id. at 213–14, 218. 
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recently implemented, by decree, Argentina’s ratification of an international 
convention prohibiting the granting of amnesty for war crimes and
crimes against humanity) and a domestic push in the country itself to 
hold accountable the perpetrators of crimes during the Junta’s Regime, 
the Government was able to maneuver the Argentine Congress into
repealing both the The Full Stop Law and The Law of Due Obedience.32 
Shortly thereafter, in 2005, Kirchner appointees to the Argentine 
Supreme Court helped sway the Court in declaring both The Full Stop 
Law and The Law of Due Obedience unconstitutional.33 
In the case of Chile after 1999, the first step into breaking the 
transitional justice pact imposed by the authoritarian Pinochet Regime
on its successors was made by the courts.  In June 1999, relying on a 
complicated legal argument which held that the 1978 Amnesty Law
could not apply to disappeared persons,34 the Chilean Supreme Court 
(upholding a lower court verdict) held the 1978 Amnesty Law did not
apply to such cases.35  The Chilean Supreme Court was able to rule in 
such a fashion because it was no longer dominated by Pinochet era 
appointees. The Court had seen a rapid turnover in membership from 
1997 to 1998 when the Chilean Congress passed a constitutional 
amendment putting a mandatory retirement age of seventy-five on 
justices and expanded the composition of the Court to twenty-one 
members.36  The parties on the left had been able to gain the support of
the more conservative parties in the Chilean Senate in order to pass the
amendment because the conservative parties, eyeing future presidential
elections, wished to distance themselves from disreputable symbols of 
the authoritarian past (i.e. the Pinochet appointee dominated Supreme 
Court).37 
B. Specific Types of Legal Institutions
Legal institutions can take many shapes and forms besides the simple
stand-by of a court.  Any institution backed by the power of the state and 
charged with dispensing some sort of legal judgment—whether a 
judgment against a specific person or persons, or a judgment interpreting
32. Sikkink & Walling, supra note 16, at 313–19. 
33. Id. at 317.
34. The concrete result of this argument being that kidnappings were viewed as still (in 
the absence of a body) technically in commission and thus beyond the 1973–1978 time frame 
covered by the Amnesty Law.
35. Pion-Berlin, supra note 24, at 483. 
36. Id. at 500.
37. Id. at 500–01. 
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a point of law or fact—can be classified as a legal institution.  The type 
of legal institution that is tasked with implementing transitional justice is
an important variable to grasp. This being said, there is nothing to
prevent countries undertaking transitional justice to use more than one 
type of legal institution to do so—as will be seen. 
1. Regular (Domestic) Courts 
This legal institution is the simplest and most familiar—the regular 
everyday criminal and civil courts of a country.
In South Africa’s transition (c. 1991–present) out of the authoritarian
Apartheid Regime of the Afrikaner-dominated National Party (NP), 
there were two specific types of legal institutions utilized to implement
transitional justice—one being the regular everyday criminal courts of 
the country.  Recall that the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act had set out a procedure through which people having committed
apartheid-era political crimes could apply for amnesty.38  Those who did
not apply for amnesty could then be held criminally liable for their 
apartheid-era political crimes.  The prosecution of such people fell to the 
regular South African courts and the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA), the country’s sole prosecutorial authority per the South African
Constitution.39  As the country’s sole prosecutorial authority, the NPA 
possessed the discretion to either prosecute suspected perpetrators or to 
agree to plea bargains where the suspects would plead guilty to lesser 
charges.40  The NPA decided whether to enter into a plea deal with 
suspected perpetrators by determining whether the suspected perpetrators
had made a full disclosure and cooperated with the investigation; 
whether the crime was political in nature; the personal circumstances of
the suspected perpetrators (e.g. remorse); the health of the suspected 
perpetrators; and the level of seriousness of the offense.41 
As discussed earlier, Argentina implemented transitional justice 
through its regular criminal courts, both during its initial transition (c.
1983–1987) up until the process was halted by the pact reached between
38. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, supra note 14. 
39. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, Ch. 8, § 179(2). 
40. Id.
41. National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, Prosecutions Policy and
Directives Relating to Prosecution of Offences Emanating from Conflicts of the Past and 
Which Were Committed on or Before 11 May 1994, promulgated 1 Dec. 1995, Appendix 
A, Sections C(a)–(h). 
 185
















   
  
 
the Alfonsin Government and the Military resulting in The Full Stop 
Law and The Law of Due Obedience; and then later after 2003 when the 
Argentine Congress (followed two years later by the Supreme Court) 
overturned both the The Full Stop Law and The Law of Due Obedience. 
Similarly, in the case of Chile after 1999—after the 1978 Amnesty 
Law was declared unconstitutional by the Chilean Supreme Court—the 
door was opened for Chile to implement transitional justice through its 
regular criminal courts. 
In Rwanda’s transition (c. 1994–present), there were two specific 
types of legal institutions utilized to implement transitional justice—one
being the regular everyday criminal courts of the country.  Shortly after 
taking power in 1994, the RPF Regime began arresting thousands of 
people under suspicion of participating in the genocide that had been
perpetrated by the old Habyarimana Regime. By 1996 over 120,000 
people, nearly 2% of the country’s population, were languishing in 
prison awaiting trial.42 Needless to say, the ability of the country’s
judicial system to absorb such a high number of defendants was limited,
resulting in a large backlog of cases as thousands spent years waiting in 
prison for the cases to reach trial.43 
2. Special (Domestic) Courts 
These legal institutions are courts that have been specifically established 
to implement transitional justice, segregated from a country’s regular 
courts. These “special” courts can either closely resemble the regular 
domestic criminal or civil courts of their country, or can be institutionally 
designed to appear quite different. 
As was discussed earlier, one of the transitional justice schemes 
utilized during Rwanda’s transition (c. 1994–present) was criminal trials 
in the country’s regular courts, with the sheer number of cases 
backlogged in the country’s regular court system leading to thousands of 
defendants stuck in prison awaiting trial.  To cope with this backlog, the 
RPF Regime chose to utilize a second transitional justice scheme aside 
from the country’s regular courts.  The scheme chosen was a “special” 
type of domestic court, created specifically to deal with the mass
atrocities committed by the old Regime in 1994.  These special courts,
called Gacaca courts, utilized a streamlined judicial procedure based on
indigenous, rather than western, legal traditions.  The Rwandan parliament 
42. Timothy Longman, Justice at the Grassroots? Gacaca Trials in Rwanda, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE
208–09 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006). 
43. Id. 
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passed the statute setting up the Gacaca courts in October 2000, with the
courts beginning operation in June 2002.44  Gacaca courts operated 
within the rural communities that make up the country.  Each community of
100 to 500 families elected a set of nineteen “judges” who were then 
given a short thirty-day course in basic legal procedure.45  The nineteen
judges within the community or cell would then appoint representatives
to the sector panel, who would then appoint representatives to the district
panel, who would then, in turn, appoint representatives to the provincial 
panel.46  Gacaca courts could impose punishments ranging from banishment 
to thirty years imprisonment.47  Gacaca judges would prepare indictments 
through consultation with their communities,48 whose members would 
then take part in the trial as witnesses testifying against the accused.49 
With the exception of the crimes of planning or organizing murder and
rape, which were reserved for the regular Rwandan criminal courts, 
Gacaca courts were authorized to try all manner of crimes from murder
to causing bodily harm.50 
3. Quasi-Judicial Institutions 
Quasi-judicial institutions are legal institutions that usually do not 
possess the power to impose criminal sanctions on an individual or set of
individuals, but do have (similar to courts) a fact-finding component to
them. 
As was discussed earlier, one of the transitional justice schemes 
utilized during South Africa’s transition (c. 1991–present) was criminal
trials in the country’s regular courts.  Recall that the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act51 set out a procedure through 
which people having committed apartheid-era political crimes could 
apply for amnesty.  Those who did not apply for amnesty then could be 
held criminally liable for their apartheid-era political crimes.  If one 
decided to potentially avoid trial and instead apply for amnesty, then one 
44. Id. at 210–12. 
45. Id. at 211.
46. Id. 
47. Christopher J. Le Mon, Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts, 14 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 16 (2007). 
48. Longman, supra note 42, at 211, 217. 
49. Id. 
50. Le Mon, supra note 47, at 17. 
51. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, supra note 14. 
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did so through a quasi-judicial body set up by the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act known as the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC).  The TRC was composed of seventeen commissioners, 
chosen directly by the South African President, who were empowered to
record and investigate apartheid era abuses, grant amnesty to 
perpetrators in exchange for a full disclosure of the truth behind the 
crime, and assist victims through obtaining information about individual 
cases.52  The work of the TRC was accomplished through three staffed
Committees, a Human Rights Violations Committee investigating 
human rights violations which occurred between 1960 and 1994, an
amnesty Committee that considered amnesty requests, and a Reparation 
and Rehabilitation Committee that sought to formulate proposals for 
dealing with the rehabilitation of victims.53 Those seeking amnesty 
would be granted it as long as the crime fell between 1960 and 1994; the 
crime was political in nature and not committed for any personal gain or 
malice; and the full facts (as well as chain of command) of the crime in
question were revealed.  Those seeking amnesty did not have to express
any remorse.54  Interestingly, as part of its mandate to establish the truth 
behind apartheid era crimes, the TRC had the power to subpoena 
witnesses to testify before it.55 
In addition to pursuing transitional justice through its regular courts 
between 1983 and 1987 and 2003 to present, Argentina also utilized a 
national commission of inquiry, known as CONADEP, which was set up 
by President Alfonsin in December 1983 and tasked with ascertaining
the fate of the thousands of Argentineans who had disappeared during 
the Junta’s Regime.  CONADEP interviewed thousands of victims and 
families of victims in order to discover the fate of the disappeared.
Although it received no support from the Military, whose members 
refused to offer testimony to the Commission, CONADEP was able to 
formulate a fairly clear picture of the Military’s direct role in the crimes 
committed by the Junta.56  CONADEP released the results of its inquiry 
in September 1984, in a highly publicized report entitled Nunca Mas.57 
Due to the failure of the Military to cooperate with it (CONADEP did
not possess the power to subpoena witnesses), Nunca Mas could not
offer a conclusion regarding the fate of all the disappeared, but it was
able to collect specific information on a number of cases and paint a
 52. Wilson, supra note 13, at 204–05. 
53. Id. at 207.
54. Id. at 209.
55. Id. at 205–06. 
56. RONIGER & SZNAJDER, supra note 15, at 59, 62. 
57. Id. at 62. 
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general overall picture of the Military’s tactics of repression and torture 
during the Junta’s Regime.58  On the flip side, the publication of Nunca
Mas served to further enflame the Military officer corps and further 
cemented their dissatisfaction with the Alfonsin Government.59 
As was detailed earlier, prior to 1999, Chile found its options for 
transitional justice severely curtailed by the pact the Pinochet Regime 
had managed to impose on its democratic successor.  One area however,
prior to 1999 and the breaking of that pact, where the old Regime was 
unable to constrain its successor was in the quasi-judicial arena where, in
April 1990, President Alywin established a National Commission of
Truth and Reconciliation (Rettig Commission) to investigate violations 
of human rights (resulting in death) that occurred in Chile between
1973–1990.60 The main task of the Commission was to formulate a
general understanding of the methods and reasons behind the human 
rights violations that occurred during the Pinochet Regime.61  Although 
it received no support from the Military, whose members refused to offer 
testimony to the Commission (the Commission did not possess the
power to subpoena witnesses), the Commission was able to construct a
determination regarding several thousand victims who had either 
disappeared or died.62  The Commission’s well received Report, released 
in March 1991, revealed to the country the depths of the crimes
committed by the Pinochet Regime.  Although the Military disagreed
with the conclusions of the Rettig Commission’s Report, it did not view 
them as a threat to its standing. 
C. Putting the Pieces Together: A Typology of 
Transitional Episodes 
By way of the review conducted above of the various episodes of 
transitional justice around the world since the 1970s, a clear picture 
begins to emerge. Through an analysis of the various mechanisms for
transitional justice available to newly transitioning states, and an
assessment of the two identified variables present in any transition 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 63–64. 
60. Id. at 97–99. 
61. Jorge Correa S., Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations: The Chilean
Case After Dictatorship, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1465 (1992). 
62. Id. at 1466–67. 
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situation: (1) the existence of a “pact” between the old authoritarian
regime and the new regime dealing with the administration of justice for 
any crimes that may have been committed in the past; and (2) the 
specific type of legal institution tasked with bringing old authoritarian
regime perpetrators to account—the following typology of transitional 
justice episodes (and available mechanisms) can be presented.





















Key: Spain  = 1975-1979 
Argentina (1) = 1983-1987 
Argentina (1.5) = 1987-2003 
Argentina (2) = 2003-present 
Chile (1) = 1989-1999 
Chile (2) = 1999-present 
South Africa = 1991-present 
Rwanda = 1994-present 
Looking at the various transitions cases and their place on the typology, 
the following empirical conclusions can be drawn: 
First, it seems clear that transitional justice pacts, a common 
understanding between the old and new regimes regarding the procedures 
and extent through which transitional justice will be undertaken, do 
matter.  Where a pact is in place that recognizes the need for a robust 
transitional justice process, as in Rwanda and South Africa, the process
goes much smoother. Where a pact is in place that seeks to limit
available options for transitional justice as in Spain, Argentina (1.5), and 
Chile (1), the risk of the process endangering political stability is 
lessened because the parties are unable or unwilling to take the process 
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beyond that which is acceptable to one another. This reality is clear 
enough in comparing Spain, Argentina (1.5), and Chile (1) with 
Argentina (1) and its back and forth conflicts between the Alfonsin
Government and the Military.  While it is true that Argentina (2) and 
Chile (2) also did not possess pacts, but were relatively stable politically, 
they can be distinguished from Argentina (1).  In both Argentina (2) and
Chile (2), there was an initial transitional justice pact at the start of the 
transition that was later broken when the power dynamics (between the 
old regime and new) began to shift away from relative equilibrium (give 
and take) towards a massive advantage for one side over the other.  In 
Argentina (2), the Kirchner Government could count on both a global 
imperative towards human rights, as well as the strong domestic support 
of the populace, to repeal both the The Full Stop Law and The Law of
Due Obedience and break the old pact.  Similarly in Chile (2), the 
widening discredit of the old Pinochet Regime by 1999 prompted even
the conservative political block in the Chilean Senate to rally behind the 
Frei Government in its move to reform the Supreme Court and break the 
old pact. In Argentina (1) on the other hand, the transitional justice 
process initially began without a pact and thus both sides, the Alfonsin 
Government and the Military, were unsure of what the limits of 
acceptability to either party were.
Second, the typology presented makes clear that the specific type of 
legal institution tasked with putting the transitional justice mechanism 
into action do not matter a great deal.  The relative success or failure of
transitional justice is dependant on the existence, or lack thereof, of a
clear transitional justice pact. The type of specific legal institution tasked
with putting the transitional justice mechanism into action does not make 
a significant difference in either its success or failure. Take for example
using regular courts to implement transitional justice. In Rwanda, South 
Africa, Argentina (2), and Chile (2), where there existed either a
transitional justice pact, or there once existed one that was later broken, 
transitional justice via the regular courts proceeded relatively smoothly. 
In Argentina (1), on the other hand, where the transitional justice process
initially began without a pact, transitional justice via the regular courts 
was a disaster. 
This is not to say that the specific model of legal institution used to 
put the transitional justice mechanism into action is of no importance,
rather, it is of no importance when it comes to analyzing the potential
success or failure of transitional justice in a specific context.  Indeed, as 
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just one example, there have been numerous debates between various 
transitional justice scholars regarding either the advantage of criminal
prosecutions (of alleged old regime crimes) over quasi-judicial truth
commissions,63 the unique advantage truth commissions possess over 
other alternatives,64 or of the relative advantages certain truth commissions
such as the South African TRC (with its power of subpoena and ability
to offer amnesty conditioned on the cooperation of alleged perpetrators) 
have over other models.  These debates are valid and useful in helping us 
assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of institutional models, but
they do not assist us in understanding why transitional justice is
successfully pursued in some contexts, but not in others.
Armed with the seeming empirical proof that the existence, or lack
thereof, of clear transitional justice pacts during the initial stages of 
transition directly affect the success or failure of transitional justice, we 
can move forward and attempt to test this proposition on a current case 
—that of Serbia during the 2000–2005 period. 
III. POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SERBIAN CASE
Starting in earnest in May of 1989, and finally ending in 2000, the rule 
of strongman Slobodan Milošević over Serbia was, to say the least,
disastrous. Enflaming ethnic and religious nationalism, Milošević
helped engineer the break-up of the formerly multi-ethnic Yugoslavia 
into the six successor states.65  Making use of the potent Serbian 
nationalism that had been repressed under four decades of Communist
rule, Milošević and his fellow travelers in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina unleashed the bloodiest conflict to emerge in Europe since 
the end of World War II.
A. The Domestic Legacy of the Milošević Regime 
Within the domestic Serbian scene, the damage Milošević inflicted
was no less severe. Various organized crime syndicates, nurtured by the 
Milošević Regime as a useful tool for busting U.N. imposed economic 
sanctions of the early-1990s, gained a controlling influence over the 
Serbian economy, which they continued to hold during the 2000–2005 
period. These syndicates, urged on by the Regime, would often form 
63. See, e.g., Juan E. Mendez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997). 
64. See, e.g., José Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints:
The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1425, 1433 (1992). 
65. I.e., Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. 
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irregular paramilitary units and take part in the worst excesses of the 
Yugoslav civil war.  Milošević’s theory of rule involved not asserting his 
control over the Serbian state, but rather gradually destroying those 
Serbian institutions guaranteeing the rule of law and replacing them with
an informal network of Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) cronies and 
organized criminal syndicates.66  Milošević was able to retain control not
by exerting absolute control over the institutions of the state, but rather 
through bypassing and subverting the institutions of the state.  It is with
this legacy of eviscerated state institutions and parallel underground 
centers of power that Serbia had to contend with during the 2000–2005 
period.
B. Serbia After Milošević: 2000–2005
On October 5, 2000, with the election of Vojislav Koštunica to the
Federal Presidency, the long and disastrous rule of Slobodan Milošević
came to an end.  Milošević was unseated, in large part, due to the fact
that the often factitious Serbian opposition had finally united into one 
block, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), and chosen
Koštunica, a moderate nationalist, as its common presidential candidate.
In December of 2000, the change in regime was solidified when DOS
swept to power in Serbian Parliamentary elections, and Zoran Đinđić, 
one of the prime leaders in DOS and Koštunica’s campaign manager, 
became Prime Minister of Serbia. In the next year, DOS began to
fracture as two camps began to emerge: moderate nationalists, looking
more towards the nonaligned movement for inspiration (rallying around 
Koštunica and his Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia or DSS), and a 
more “liberal” group looking firmly to the West for inspiration (rallying 
around Đinđić and his Party, the Democratic Party or DS).  With the 
dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the State-Union
of Serbia-Montenegro in February of 2003, Koštunica was temporarily 
sidelined when his job of Yugoslav Federal President was eliminated.
In the Serbian Parliamentary elections held in December of 2004, the 
fractured DOS government, headed by Đinđić’s Democratic Party (DS),
was booted out of office due to various corruption scandals and
allegations.  Alarmingly, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), an unapologetic
66. See ADAM LEBOR, MILOŠEVIĆ: A BIOGRAPHY 158–59, 263–64 (Bloomsbury 2002).
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fascist offshoot of Slobodan Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), 
won the majority of mandates contested (82 out of 250).  The new 
Government coalition that took over, with Vojislav Koštunica as the new 
Prime Minister of Serbia, was composed of an unstable grouping of 
parties headed by Koštunica’s DSS,67 who had nothing in common save 
for their desire to prevent the Radicals (SRS) or Democratic Party (DS)
from assuming power.  The Government did not even possess a majority
of the 250 seats in the Serbian Parliament, and as such was forced to rely
on the votes of the Socialists (SPS), Slobodan Milošević’s Party, to 
govern.68  The result of this alliance was the steady appointment of
former Milošević Regime officials into deputy positions within the 
various ministries.  This fractured Koštunica Government would last 
until 2007. 
1. Organized Crime’s Infiltration of the Serbian Economy 
With the imposition of U.N. economic sanctions in 1992 and 1993,69 
the Serbian economy, already weak from the legacy of Communist
mismanagement in the 1980s, was dealt a final deathblow.  Economically
closed off from the rest of the world, Serbian society became impoverished 
and, thanks to Milošević, increasingly criminalized. 
To cope with the lack of goods brought about by the sanctions regime, 
a parallel economy, nurtured by the Milošević, soon sprang up. 
Entrenched in already existing Communist-era smuggling and black 
market networks, this parallel economy, run by organized criminal 
elements, soon gained a commanding foothold over the economy of the 
state—all personally overseen by Milošević. The state sponsorship of 
organized criminality had a long history in Yugoslavia/Serbia. In the 
1980s, the Yugoslav State Security Services had co-opted the country’s
gangsters and transformed them into informal criminal temps.70 
Passports were provided, and in exchange for being allowed to go
abroad and steal as much as they wanted or could, the criminals
performed tasks directed by their overlords back in Belgrade (such as 
67. Vojislav Koštunica’s moderately nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS),
the technocratic Group of 17 Plus Party (G17+), and the monarchist New Serbia/Serbian 
Renewal Movement Coalition (NS/SPO). 
68. The SPS, at the time still led formally by Slobodan Milošević, even though he 
was in detention in the Hague, where he was being tried by the ICTY on charges of war
crimes and genocide, had won a respectable twenty-two mandates in the December 2004
parliamentary elections.
69. See S.C. Res. 757, U.N. Doc S/RES/757 (May 30, 1992); S.C. Res. 787, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/787 (Nov. 16, 1992); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. Doc S/RES/820 (Apr. 17, 1993). 
70. LEBOR, supra note 66, at 216. 
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targeted assassinations of political dissidents).71  Milošević then had a 
good base from which to work, and he utilized it to the hilt. The 
gangsters smuggled in enough oil, durable goods, and food to keep the 
Regime afloat, and in turn they were given a free hand to slowly co-opt
and take over large segments of the banking and manufacturing sectors.72 
With the complete lifting of U.N. sanctions in 2001, the control 
organized criminal groups exerted over the Serbian economy was no 
longer centered on sanctions-busting, but was rather more nuanced in 
nature, though no less intrusive.  Utilizing the excellent black market
networks that they developed in the 1990s, organized criminal groups in
Serbia exerted the lion’s share of their control over the Serbian economy
via smuggling consumable and durable goods under the noses of the 
customs authorities,73 selling the items, and keeping the untaxed 
profits.74  This so-called “gray economy” was rampant in Serbia during
the 2000–2005 period and contributed directly to the chronic debt facing 
the Serbian state (due to lost customs revenue).  The “gray economy”
also cemented the unrivalled control of organized crime over economic 
life and development in the country.  The monies obtained by organized 
criminal groups from their activities in the “gray economy” were laundered 
through offshore companies registered in Cyprus, the Seychelles, 
Liberia, and the British Virgin Islands.75 The accounts of these companies
were located mostly in banks that had head offices in countries near
Serbia (such as Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, etc.), with the money being
returned to Serbia through imported goods (for sale in the “gray
economy”) or investments in the Serbian privatization process76 and real 
71. Id. 
72. U.S. Dep’t of State, The New Class Revisited: Belgrade’s Mafia War Heats Up
as Sanctions-Busting Affords Huge Profits, (July 6, 1994), ¶ 8 (unclassified department 
cable, on file with the U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.). 
73. The Serbian economy at the time was highly dependant on imports, mostly in
consumer goods.  The reasons behind this dependence stemmed from the fact that Serbia’s
technology levels (within the manufacturing sector) were some nineteen years behind EU
countries and seven years behind developing countries.  This lead to Serbian commodities 
being overpriced, while the domestic demand for imported goods was in conflict with the 
sustainable operational limits of the economy. Dejan Berković, Bananas & Cigarettes, CORD, 
May 2005, at 26–27. 
74. U.S. Dep’t of State, Narcotics and Financial Crime in Serbia, (Dec. 19, 2003), 
¶¶ 5–6 (unclassified department cable, on file with the U.S. Department of
State, Washington D.C.).
75. Id. ¶ 6. 
76. I.e., the public auction of formerly state-owned industries. 
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estate market.77  The tentacles of organized crime ran deep within this
activity, with various Government officials seemingly in on the process.78 
The Koštunica Government, leery of going against the powerful
vested organized criminal elements that controlled the economy, was 
careful in its approach to the “gray economy” and the rampant money
laundering which accompanied it.  Seeking an accommodation rather 
than a confrontation, the Government, in January 2005, introduced a 
Value Added Tax (VAT) of 18% (on goods and services), to replace the 
20% sales tax in place up to that point.  In theory, the implementation of 
a VAT would serve to reduce the “gray economy” by improving tax 
administration and revenue collection. In reality, the Government was 
exceedingly careful not to go after mafia affiliated businesses and
interests.79  Indeed, the Government vigorously enforced the VAT on 
small private interests, but made sure to leave the large segments of the
mafia-controlled manufacturing center alone.80 
In 2002, the then federal Yugoslav Parliament paid lip service to 
combat the rampant money laundering occurring in the country by
passing the Law on Money Laundering.81  In theory, the Law targeted 
money laundering by specifically criminalizing the depositing of any 
monies into the Serbian financial system that had been acquired through 
illegal activity, including money derived from the “gray market”
economy.  The Law required numerous government and private 
entities82 to identify persons opening an account or “establishing any 
other kind of lasting business cooperation with the client,” and report on 
every transaction exceeding CSD 600,000.83 Criminal penalties for 
money laundering violations ranged from six months to eight years 
imprisonment.84  To enforce the Law, the Federal Parliament established 
a special office within the Ministry of Finance, the Federal Commission for
77. Interview with Jerry Rowe, Special Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Office of
Technical Assistance, in Belgrade, Serbia (Apr. 11, 2005). 
78. In two of the better known cases from the 2000–2005 period, Zoran Janjušević, 
a former security advisor to the Serbian Prime Minister, and Nemanja Kolesar, former 
director of the National Bank of Serbia’s Rehabilitation Agency, were placed under 
investigation for their alleged involvement in the laundering of money through offshore 
accounts in several financial safe haven countries.
79. Interview with Confidential Source, in Belgrade, Serbia (Apr. 4, 2005). 
80. Id.
81. Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE FRY,
No. 53/2001. 
82. These government and private entities included: commercial/savings banks and
other financial credit institutions; the postal savings bank, the post office and other commercial 
enterprises; foreign exchange bureaus, casinos, pawnshops, and national lottery organizers; 
and all government entities, including the National Bank of Serbia. Id. art. 4. 
83. Id. arts. 5–7.
84. Id. art. 27. 
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the Prevention of Money Laundering, since renamed the Serbian
Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering.85  Despite the
name, the Administration did not act to prevent money laundering by
seizing assets (it was not a law enforcement agency).  Rather, the
Administration, staffed by just seventeen people, acted as a sort of
informal clearinghouse for collected financial information.86  The  
Administration’s effectiveness in deterring money laundering lay in its
utilization by other government agencies and bodies.  At the request of 
other government agencies and bodies, the Administration collected 
information on financial transactions and used it to determine whether 
money laundering was actually taking place and nothing more.87 The
Administration had no power to initiate investigations on its own. From its
establishment in 2002, and through 2005, the Administration’s 
utilization by other government agencies and bodies was nonexistent. 
The financial tentacles of Serbia’s organized criminal groups ran deep,
and given their continued virtual monopoly over security services, to
oppose their interests openly did not seem to be in the interests of the 
Serbian state.
2. Organized Crime’s Infiltration of the Serbian    
Security Services
Not content having unleashed his organized crime partners into the 
Serbian economy; Milošević soon realized that he could also utilize 
organized criminals as a fighting force in the Yugoslav civil war.  The
incentive for the organized criminal gangs was the freedom to plunder 
and pillage, as well as the continued blind look at their increasing
control of the Serbian economy.  With the end of the Yugoslav civil war, 
these organized criminal groups began to infiltrate the state security 
services, much as they had previously infiltrated the Serbian economy. 
The epitome of the nexus between the organized criminal groups and 
state security services could be seen in the story of the Serbian Ministry 
of Interior’s (MuP) Special Operations Unit (JSO). The JSO, or “Red
85. Despite its initial name, the Commission only really had jurisdiction in Serbia
(and not the sister constituent Republic of Montenegro), hence the change of name. 
86. The type of financial information collected included suspicious transactions 
information covered by the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering. Interview with 
Tatjana Durašinović, Head of Int’l Relations Dep’t, Serbia Administration for the 
Prevention of Money Laundering, in Belgrade, Serbia (Apr. 11, 2005). 
87. Id. 
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Berets,” were formed on Milošević’s order on May 4, 1991 at the start of 
the Yugoslav civil war. Jovica Stanisić, the Chief of the Serbian State 
Security Service (RDB), and Franko “Frenki” Simatović, an RDB 
operative, organized the Unit.88  Milošević created the Unit because he 
did not fully trust the military, an institution of the old multi-ethnic 
Yugoslavia. The RDB on the other hand was part of the Serbian 
Ministry of Interior (MuP), and therefore could be solidly relied upon.
Although administrated by the RDB, the Unit initially had neither an
official name, nor legal status.89  This was done for two reasons. First, 
as the Unit was composed almost solely of criminals with economic ties 
to the Regime, Milošević wanted to hide its formal ties to the state as 
much as possible.  Second, because Milošević used the Unit as his
“strike force” in the wars, giving them the green light to commit war
crimes of every kind (including murder, rape, and pillage), he did not
wish to be associated with their actions lest he too be branded by charges
of war crimes.90  With the conclusion of the civil war in 1995, Milošević
decided to formalize the Unit, making it a brigade-ranked military unit 
with three hundred active duty and seven hundred reserve solders.  Now 
officially part of the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MuP), and led by the
Belgrade underworld criminal Milorad “Legija” Ulemek, the Special 
Operations Unit (JSO) was born.
Under Legija’s leadership, the JSO became Milošević’s personal 
praetorian guard. The Unit received the best equipment available (e.g. 
armored humvees, artillery, helicopters), and its members received
salaries far above those paid to the regular military or police.  The JSO 
was funded in part from criminal sources, receiving a cut of the
Regime’s profits from smuggling gas and cigarettes, later actually taking 
part in the smuggling process itself.91 In return for such largesse, the JSO 
did Milošević’s dirty work, organizing the assassinations of prominent 
Regime dissidents such as former Yugoslav President Ivan Stambolić
and publisher Slavko Čuruvija; the JSO also attempted an assassination 
of the prominent opposition leader Vuk Drašković.92 By the late 1990s,
it was increasingly impossible to distinguish the organized criminal 
groups brought into the state security services by Milošević, and the 
state security services themselves.
88. U.S. Dep’t of State, A Short History of the Red Berets, (Mar. 31, 2003), ¶ 2
(unclassified department cable, on file with the U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.). 
89. The Unit was simply known as “Frenki’s Boys” (Frenkijevci).  Id. ¶ 4.
90. This strategy however did not work as in May of 1999 Milošević was indicted 
by the ICTY for war crimes. 
91. U.S. Dep’t of State, A Short History of the Red Berets, supra note 88, ¶ 9.
92. Id. ¶ 11. 
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With the fall of the Milošević Regime, the infighting within the 
victorious democratic opposition served the organized criminal elements 
within the state security services well. Too divided and weak to confront
such forces, the democratic opposition tried to co-opt them instead.  As 
such, after the new DOS coalition took power, the privileged status and
power of Milošević’s security apparatus, including the JSO, continued as
before.93  In fact, the new democratic authorities used the JSO to arrest 
Milošević himself in June of 2001. It was a JSO helicopter that
transported Milosevic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
base in Tuzla (Bosnia), from where he would be transported to the
ICTY’s detention center in the Hague.94  The JSO could no longer be said 
to be a part of the state security apparatus; it was the state security
apparatus—all controlled by the organized criminals who staffed it, and 
taking orders from Serbia’s top mafia leader Milorad “Legija” Ulemek,
the JSO commander.  At this point the JSO was virtually indistinguishable 
from Serbia’s top mafia gang, the Zemun Crime Gang, as the two
organizations shared members, information, and activities.95  Indeed, the
JSO operated a veritable state within a state, controlling a magazine,
“Identitet,”96 and various other syndicates.97 
The height of the JSO’s power, and by extension the Serbian mafia, 
came in November of 2001 when, alarmed by the Government’s
continued cooperation with the ICTY, Legija directed the JSO to mutiny
against the then Serbian Government (headed at the time by Prime
93. Indeed, it was during this period, that the JSO became even more brazen than it
had ever been under the Milošević Regime.  Legija acted with public impunity, burning 
down a Disco in Kula (near the JSO’s barracks) because of a financial dispute with its
owner (threatening to shoot any firefighter who dared try to put out the blaze); shooting 
up the Štupica nightclub in downtown Belgrade; and blowing up a rival’s road building
company with plastic explosives. See id. ¶ 16. 
94. See supra note 90. 
95. See U.S. Dep’t of State, The Serbian Government Targets Organized Crime Gang
(Mar. 13, 2003), (unclassified department cable, on file with the U.S. Department of State,
Washington D.C.); Đinđić Assasination: Serbian Police Roundup Continues (Mar. 17, 2003),
(unclassified department cable, on file with the U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.);
U.S. Dep’t of State, Legija Surrenders, (May 4, 2004) ¶ 4 (unclassified department cable, on
file with the U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.). 
96. In whose pages Legija would rant and rave against Government cooperation
with the ICTY, glorify the JSO, and issue threats with impunity.  See U.S. Dep’t of State,
A Short History of the Red Berets, supra note 88, ¶ 21. 
97. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. 
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Minister Zoran Đinđić).98  The main goal of the mutiny was to intimidate 
the Government into changing course and not arresting and extraditing 
ICTY indictees.99 Elements of the JSO blocked traffic on the main 
Belgrade highway and demanded the dismissal of the Interior Minister,
and both the director and deputy director of the Serbian State Security 
Service (RDB).  Prime Minister Đinđić appeared to initially concede to 
the JSO’s demands.  Although Đinđić did not dismiss the Interior 
Minister, Dušan Mihajlović, he did replace both the director and deputy 
director of the RDB, and appointed prominent JSO leader Milorad
Bračanović as deputy RDB director.  In March of 2003, rumors began to 
circulate that Đinđić was getting ready to resume his cooperation with
the ICTY and arrest and extradite known war criminals indicted by the 
Tribunal. On March 10, 2003, the JSO-controlled magazine, “Identitet,” 
published an editorial in which it warned Đinđić that he would be killed 
if he resumed cooperation with the ICTY.  On March 11, 2003, Prime 
Minister Đinđić was assassinated by a long-range shot to the chest as he 
exited his official car to enter the Serbian Government building. Prime 
Minister Đinđić’s murder could, in part, be seen as a direct result on the 
inherent weakness of the institutions of the state he served.100 
In late March, Legija and other JSO members were officially indicted
for the murder of Prime Minister Đinđić.  Legija promptly “disappeared,” 
and would not be “found” until May 2004.  The JSO was disbanded, but 
most of its members were simply transferred into a new brigade within 
the Ministry of Interior (MuP), the Gendarmerie (SAJ). 
The nefarious control and influence of the Serbian mafia over the 
security services of the state, and thereby over the state itself, continued 
after the assassination of Prime Minister Đinđić. Radovan Karadžić and 
98. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Three ICTY Indictees Go to the Hague; Secret Police 
Unit Revolts (Nov. 13, 2001) (unclassified department cable, on file with the U.S. Department
of State, Washington D.C.).
99. The interest of the JSO/Serbian mafia in whether the Serbian Government 
cooperated with the ICTY or not was simple, many of the Unit’s senior leadership, including
Legija, feared that the ICTY would at some point indict them for war crimes committed in the 
Yugoslav civil war, just as it had indicted Milošević.  They had made a tactical deal with the 
Government that once Milošević was surrendered to the ICTY, no more indictees would be 
arrested and extradited, now they wanted to underlie this point. Id. ¶ 4.
100. Commenting on the political factors that led to the assassination, journalist 
Miloš Vasić stated “it is humiliatingly obvious that the assassination of Zoran Đinđić
was directly connected with Serbia’s ‘non-state’ character, whereby conditions meant it 
was not possible to precisely identify the state. In conditions like that it is not known 
who has the right to employ instruments of physical force and who doesn’t . . . moreover,
reliable rules did not exist to separate what is permitted from what is forbidden.” MILOŠ
VASIĆ, ATENTAT NA ZORANA ĐINĐIĆA 293 (Narodna Knjiga 2005). 
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Ratko Mladić,101 the two most wanted indictees on the ICTY’s list
remained at large throughout the 2000–2005 period, nearly a decade 
after their initial indictments for war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and (in the case of Mladić) genocide.  During this period of time, there 
was strong evidence to suggest that not only were these two wanted 
fugitives in the territory of Serbia, but they were also being protected by 
the state security services.102  At the time, the then Foreign Minister, 
former opposition leader Vuk Drašković, stated that the state security 
services not only knew where Karadžić and Mladić were, but were also
actively hiding and protecting them.103 
C. The ICTY and Political Instability in Serbia 
During the 2000–2005 period, the biggest political conflict in the 
country was centered around the issue of cooperation with the ICTY. 
Under both International104 and domestic Serbian law,105 the Government of
Serbia was required to find, arrest, and extradite to the ICTY any 
indicted persons residing within its territory.  After the assassination of 
Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić and the subsequent December 2004 
Serbian Parliamentary elections, which Đindić’s DOS Coalition lost, the 
new Serbian Government of Vojislav Koštunica categorically refused to 
extradite any indictees to the ICTY. The new Koštunica Government
feared that any forced physical transfer of indictees to the ICTY would 
represent a danger to Serbia’s fragile democracy.106 The powerful
organized criminal elements, already in control of vast sectors of the
economy and security establishment, would correctly view the forced
extradition of ICTY indictees as an assault on their interests.  With the
seemingly limitless resources their control of the economy guaranteed
101. The respective wartime “President” and “Generalissimo” of Serbian forces in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
102. In July 2008, Karadžić was finally apprehended in Belgrade and extradited to
the ICTY.  Mladić still remains at large.
103. See Daniel Dombey & Eric Jansson, Serbian Authorities ‘Know Where Mladic 
is Hiding’ War Crimes, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 5, 2005, § Europe, at 7.
104. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
105. See Law on Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE FRY, No. XX/2002. 
106. Dušan Stojanović, AP Interview: New Serbian Prime Minister Says Extraditing 
War Crimes Suspects Not a Priority, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 21, 2004, § Int’l News. 
 201



























   
 
 
   
     
 
 
them, as well as a willingness to use violence against the state (note the 
assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić), and significant support
from a Serbian public suspicious of the ICTY’s “anti-Serb bias,” the
danger posed seemed a very real one indeed. 
As a response to this dilemma, the Koštunica Government sought to
undertake the bare minimum of cooperation with the ICTY. The
Government’s stated policy was thus not to arrest ICTY indictees, as
was required under international and domestic law, but to rather 
encourage their “voluntary surrender” to the authorities.  By formulating 
this position, the Government sought to strike a strategic transitional 
justice pact with the mafia-dominated security services, pledging not to 
forcibly extradite anyone to the ICTY in exchange for voluntary cooperation. 
Those who voluntarily surrendered were given state guarantees on their
behalf to the ICTY, ensuring their pre-trial release. Though it faced
widespread international criticism for this stance, the Koštunica 
Government justified itself by arguing that such action would bode
better for the stability of the country.107 
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SERBIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
A. The General Legal System
1. A Civil Law System
The Serbian legal system employs the continental civil law system (as
opposed to the Anglo-Saxon common law scheme).  As such, legislation
has more legal significance than past judicial decisions.  In countries
employing the civil law system, courts are, in theory, strictly limited to 
the application of legislation. Court decisions naturally involve
interpretation, but the interpretation is not precedent that is binding on
future courts that must consider the same legislation.108  The premise is
that courts look at legislation anew, and in a vacuum, each time they
consider a law.109 
107. See Koštunica: Government Does Cooperate With ICTY, V.I.P. DAILY NEWS 
REPORT, Nov. 22, 2004.  The Prime Minister was quoted as giving the following 
statement: “Cooperate [with the ICTY] we must and cooperate we shall, until we have 
fulfilled all requests.  However, this cooperation can be conducted in various ways, not 
just in one.  There is no one form that has been prescribed, there are various forms—you
know what I’m talking about.  On top of this, one also needs to take into account the 
stability of institutions in the country.” Id.
108. John H. Crabb, Introduction to SERVAIS & MECHELYNCK, LES CODES ET LES
LOIS SPECIALES LES PLUS USUELLES EN VIGUEUR EN BELGIQUE 3 (John H. Crabb trans., 
Kluwer Law & Taxation 1982) (1975). 
109. Id. at 3. 
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In reality, however, similar decisions made by earlier courts are important 
and persuasive authority, though, of course not controlling.110  Legal  
precedence then is not entirely disregarded.  Within civil law countries, 
courts will often informally look to previous decisions made by earlier 
benches, even though they are not legally required to do so. The idea 
that civil law courts can employ decisions that are completely and 
wholly independent of each other is a myth.111  Such informal measures
can sometimes lead to a codification of sorts within the system.  For
example, there has evolved in the jurisprudence of certain civil law 
countries a legal principle called jurisprudence constante. Jurisprudence
constante holds that when five judicial decisions regarding a 
similar subject reach the same result, they acquire the status of 
written authority.112  Such a status does not mark the decisions as 
controlling precedent, but it does cement their position as persuasive 
authority.
2. Structure of the Courts
Structurally, the court system of Serbia is composed of municipal 
courts, district courts, and a Constitutional Court of Serbia. 
The courts of Serbia are held to be “autonomous and independent” in
their work.113  Judges have life tenure114 and are immune from punishment
for opinions given out in the passing of a judgment.115 Trials are open to
the public, unless such access may corrupt minors or endanger state
secrets.116 
In practice, the Serbian judiciary was susceptible to political influence 
during the 2000–2005 period.117  Parliament could recall members of the 
judiciary at any time, and was unafraid to make strategic use of this
threat.118  Reactionary and corrupt judges from the Milošević era still 
110. Id. at 4. 
111. Interview with Sima Avramović, Professor of Law, Univ. of Belgrade, in
Belgrade, Serbia (Oct. 9, 2003). 
112. Crabb, supra note 108, at 4.
 113. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, art. 96 (1990–2006). 
114. Id. art. 101. 
115. Id. art. 96. 
116. Id. art. 97. 
117. U.S. Dep’t of State, Serbia Human Rights Report 5 (Oct. 2003) (draft report, 
on file with the U.S. Embassy, Belgrade, Serbia).
118. Interview with Stefan Lilić, MP, Parliament of the Republic of Serbia, in
Belgrade, Serbia (Oct. 10, 2003). 
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occupied positions of power, with about half of the judicial pool still 
being composed of Milošević-era appointees.119  Inefficiency and poor 
communication between the judicial and political branches led to a 
backlog of cases, a situation exasperated by the lack of alternative
dispute resolution channels.120 
3. Initiation/Investigation of a General Criminal Case 
A criminal case in Serbia begins with a police inquiry, which can be
undertaken by the police independently or at the request of a prejudiced 
party.121  The police inquiry is under the nominal control of the Public
Prosecutor (the equivalent of a state district attorney or U.S. Attorney in
the United States).122  It is on the basis of this inquiry that the Public
Prosecutor decides whether to initiate criminal action or drop the inquiry.
If the decision is made to initiate a case, the Public Prosecutor shall
make a formal request to an investigative magistrate to conduct a more 
detailed investigation.123  In his or her formal request to the investigative
magistrate for a more detailed investigation, the Public Prosecutor will
detail what evidentiary procedures the investigative magistrate is to
undertake in his or her investigation.124 Though the investigative
magistrate must perform these evidentiary procedures, he or she is not 
limited by them, and can in fact investigate further if he or she feels it is
warranted.125  It is important to note that the investigative magistrate is a 
full judge, and can thus order hearings, collect evidence, and place 
people in detention.126  At the end of the investigation, the investigative
magistrate submits his or her findings to the Public Prosecutor.127 
119. U.S. Dep’t of State, Serbia Human Rights Report, supra note 117, at 17. 
120. Id.
121. Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Serbia, art. 225.
122. Id. art. 158. 
123. Id. art. 239. 
124. I.e., what documents should be subpoenaed, which witnesses should be called 
in to give evidence, etc.
125. Zoran Stojanović et al., Criminal Law (Yugoslavia), in INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAWS (CRIMINAL LAW) ¶ 574 (R. Blanpain & M. Colucci eds., 1993) (2008). 
126. Id. ¶ 33. 
127. One of the biggest problems in this process is the issue of admissibility of
evidence obtained by the police during the pre-trial proceedings.  Only evidence obtained by
the investigative magistrate is admissible at trial. For example, even if a suspect confesses to
the police right after the commission of a crime, with his attorney present, not only is
that confession inadmissible but also all the circumstances about that confession are also
inadmissible. Hence a prosecutor could not put the police officer to which a confession 
was made to on the stand and ask him or her anything about the alleged confession.  The 
only time the confession or any other sort of evidence would be admissible would be if it 
were given to the investigative magistrate in the proper form, during his or her investigation of
the case.  As such, typically, by the time the investigation gets to this phase, the suspect has
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At this point the Public Prosecutor can do one of three things: (1) he or
she can, based on the findings presented by the investigative magistrate, lay
charges and issue an indictment; (2) he or she can, based on the findings 
presented by the investigative magistrate, declare a nonsuit (a nonsuit 
can be thought of as a dismissal of charges, or rather a refusal to 
prosecute);128 or (3) he or she can ask the investigative magistrate to 
gather specific directed evidence.129 
If the Public Prosecutor decides to lay charges and issue an indictment, 
the case is brought before a presiding judge in the competent jurisdiction. 
The presiding judge may repeat the investigation of the investigative 
magistrate (i.e. investigation of the crime scene, etc.) if he or she wishes,
but is obliged to re-interview all of the listed witnesses.130  At this point
the criminal suspect under indictment can appeal his indictment to the 
Special Panel within the court in question.131  This Special Panel, made
up of the court’s senior judge and two junior justices, will then decide on 
the suspect’s appeal.  If the Special Panel upholds the indictment, the 
trial is set to begin. 
The trial itself is presided over by a panel of three judges (consisting 
of either one professional judge and two lay judges, or three professional 
judges). The President of the Panel (i.e. the presiding judge) leads the 
trial. The trial begins with the reading of the indictment, then arraignment, 
followed by the interrogation and questioning of the defendant, and 
finally, the presentation of evidence.132  The defendant can choose to 
present his defense at any time during the trial. The role of the presiding 
judge is an active one, as it is the presiding judge who decides who
testifies and when (the parties may only suggest witnesses); also, when
witnesses take the stand, it is the presiding judge who first interrogates 
them, followed by the prosecutor, victim, defense attorney, and 
defendant.133  All questions, however, are directed to the court, not to the
witness being interrogated. 
had plenty of time to change his or her mind about confessing and think up a better story.
See Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Serbia, art. 346; Stojanović et al., supra
note 125, ¶¶  33, 502. 
128. Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Serbia, art. 228.
129. I.e., questioning a specific witness, mapping out the scene of the crime, etc. 
See Stojanović et al., supra note 125, ¶¶ 573–74. 
130. Id. ¶ 637. 
131. Id. ¶ 613. 
132. Id. ¶¶ 634–41. 
133. Id. ¶¶ 632, 636. 
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B. The Specialized Judicial Institutions 
1. War Crimes
The eight war crimes trials held in Serbia from 1996 to 2003 revealed 
a conspicuous weakness in Serbia’s ability to prosecute war crimes 
within its domestic courts.134  The assassination of Prime Minister Zoran 
Đinđić on March 12, 2003 by suspected Mafia and security service 
elements prompted a public call for a crackdown on the criminal activity
that had flourished in the country since the Milošević Regime. This 
renewed pressure resulted in the Serbian Parliament establishing various 
government bodies through special legislation in July 2003: the Special 
Court for War Crimes, the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office (the Special
Court for War Crimes independent Prosecutor’s Office),135 the Special 
Court for Organized Crime, and the Organized Crime Prosecutor’s
Office (the Special Court for Organized Crimes independent Prosecutor’s
Office).136 
a. The Special Court for War Crimes
The Special Court for War Crimes was composed of: the President of 
the Court; two investigative magistrates who, in conjunction with the 
prosecutors, conducted investigations and collected evidence that was 
then admissible at trial; five trial judges; and staff.  Trial judges and
investigative magistrates were seconded from other courts in Serbia and 
served for a fixed four-year term.137  They could not be removed save for
a complex recall procedure requiring the support of at least two-thirds of
Parliament.  Technically, the Special Court for War Crimes was simply a
chamber of the Belgrade District Court.138 In practice however, the
Special Court was functionally distinct from the Belgrade District Court. 
The Special Court employed its own administrative and security staff, 
and operated out of its own building, located miles away from the Palace 
of Justice, the headquarters of the Belgrade District Court.
134. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Serbia’s Capacity to Try War Crimes One Year After 
Creation of the Special Court (Aug. 24, 2004) (unclassified department cable, on file 
with the U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.). 
135. See Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Government Authorities in
Prosecuting Perpetrators of War Crimes, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
SERBIA, No. 67/2003 [hereinafter War Crimes Law No. 67/2003]. 
136. See Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Government Authorities in
Suppression of Organized Crime, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, No.
42/2002 [hereinafter Organized Crime Law No. 42/2002]. 
137. See War Crimes Law No. 67/2003, supra note 135, art. 10. 
138. Id.
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b. The War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office 
The War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office was tasked with bringing to trial 
perpetrators of War Crimes committed within the territory of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), regardless of the 
citizenship of the perpetrator or victim.  The War Crimes Prosecutor’s
Office was composed of a Head Prosecutor,139 four deputy Prosecutors, 
and staff. The Prosecutor’s Office was an independent state agency, and 
operated out of the building of the Special Court for War Crimes.  The 
Serbian Parliament elected the Special Prosecutor for War Crimes for a
fixed four-year term.140 He could not be removed save for a complex
recall procedure that required the support of at least two-thirds of 
Parliament.  The Special Prosecutor chose his deputy Prosecutors, who
served at his leisure.141 The Special Prosecutor, as the head of an
independent state agency, was entitled to have an independent bank
account for which donations could be taken.  Aside from investigating
cases on its own initiative, one of the primary focuses of the War Crimes 
Prosecutor’s Office was to accept cases transferred to it (to be
henceforth tried domestically) by the ICTY,142 and to further investigate 
those cases in conjunction with the investigative magistrate in order to
raise the indictment.
2. Organized Crime 
a. The Special Court for Organized Crime 
The Special Court for Organized Crime was composed of the President
of the Court; three investigative magistrates who, in conjunction with the
prosecutors, conducted investigations and collected evidence that would
be admissible at trial; twelve trial judges; and assorted staff.  Trial
judges and investigative magistrates were seconded from other courts in
Serbia and served for a fixed two-year term.143  As with its counterpart
in War Crimes, the Special Court for Organized Crime was technically a 







Commonly referred to as the Special Prosecutor for War Crimes. 
See War Crimes Law No. 67/2003, supra note 135, art. 5. 
Id.
See infra Part V.A.1. 
See Organized Crime Law No. 42/2002, supra note 136, art. 13. 
Id.
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Special Court for Organized Crime operated separately from the Belgrade 
District Court. The Special Court employed its own administrative and 
security staff, and operated out of its own distinct building, rather than 
from the Palace of Justice, the headquarters of the Belgrade District
Court.
b. The Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office 
The Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office was tasked with bringing to 
trial perpetrators of organized criminal activity committed within the 
territory of the Republic of Serbia.  The Prosecutor’s Office was composed
of a Head Prosecutor,145 five deputy Prosecutors, and staff.  Unlike the
War Crimes Prosecutors, the Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office
functionally operated under the Belgrade District Prosecutor’s Office,
who in turn, was under the Republic Prosecutor’s Office.146  In order for
a case to be within the jurisdiction of the Special Prosecutor for 
Organized Crime, the Special Prosecutor had to certify a case as an
organized crime case.147  The Special Prosecutor had wide latitude in 
deciding whether to certify a case as “organized crime.”148  It was only
with the Special Prosecutor’s certification and the subsequent agreement
of the Republic Prosecutor for Serbia (Attorney-General) that a case
could be transferred to the Special Court for Organized Crime.
V. THE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE SPECIAL COURTS
The near complete organizational autonomy (from the domestic 
government structure) of the Special Courts for War Crimes and
Organized Crime transformed these agencies into free agents within the
145. Commonly referred to as the Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime. 
146. The Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime was not elected by the Parliament to a
fixed term, like the War Crimes Prosecutor, but was appointed by the Republic Prosecutor 
(Attorney General) to a fixed two year term.  Also, unlike the War Crimes Prosecutor, the 
Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime and his deputies were not an independent 
prosecutor’s office, but were organizationally and hierarchically under the Belgrade District
Prosecutor’s Office.  All of the Organized Crime Prosecutors were “borrowed” from their
native prosecutor’s office (namely the Republic Prosecutor’s Office or District Prosecutor’s 
Office) and hence could be removed by not being re-elected to their “original” positions. See
Organized Crime Law No. 42/2002, supra note 136.
147. Id. art. 2.  Article 2 defined organized criminal activity to include the following list 
of crimes (when committed in an organized manner): offenses against the constitutional order 
of the state, offenses against international humanitarian law, counterfeiting and money
laundering, the illicit production and sale of narcotics, the illicit trade of arms, illicit (black 
market) trade in general, human trafficking, robbery, aggravated theft, offering and/or accepting
bribes, extortion, and kidnapping.  Id.
148. Id. art. 6. 
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domestic Serbian polity; separate and autonomous from  the domestic 
governmental structure, they were no longer subject to the same
constituencies and constraints of their fellow government agencies.  As 
independent institutional players in the process, with their own separate
constituencies to answer to (i.e. the ICTY and international community
as a whole), the Special Courts for War Crimes and Organized Crime
emerged as direct competitors to the Government of Serbia’s attempt to
establish a unitary political policy and strategy in regards to (a) cooperation 
with the ICTY; and (b) negotiating with the powerful organized criminal
groups that continued to control the Serbian security services.
A. Organizational Autonomy of the Special Courts for War            
Crimes and Organized Crime 
Through their institutional structural designs, the Special Courts became 
autonomous institutions, no longer embedded within the domestic Serbian 
government. 
1. Case Autonomy 
Unlike the vast majority of national domestic prosecutors and courts, 
the Serbian Special Courts for War Crimes and Organized Crime possessed 
considerable autonomy and freedom in deciding which cases to pursue. 
In the case of the Special Court for War Crimes, this autonomy came 
in part from depending on a non-domestic actor for its cases—the ICTY. 
Under a procedure known as the Rule 11 Transfer,149 the ICTY was 
empowered, if it so chose, to transfer cases, either in the investigative
stage or with the indictment(s) already laid, to national courts in the 
former Yugoslavia. 
In the case of the Special Court for Organized Crime, this autonomy
came via the certification process by which the Special Prosecutor was
permitted to initiate and investigate whatever cases he so chose.150  This
was of great advantage to the Special Prosecutor as it provided him with
149. So called because such case transfers are initiated under Rule 11 bis of the
ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 3
(Jan. 30, 1995), Rule 11. 
150. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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the ability to go after only those organized criminal groups he deemed 
vulnerable enough for prosecution. 
2. Budgetary Autonomy 
Technically speaking, the Special Courts depended upon the Serbian
Parliament for their yearly operating budgets.151  In reality, both
institutions solicited the grand majority of their budgets from numerous 
international governmental and non-governmental aid agencies.  During
the fiscal years of 2004 and 2005, the United States alone allocated USD 
$12 million for funding criminal justice initiatives in Serbia (with a large 
portion of this amount going directly to the Special Courts). The 
budgetary alliance with the international community allowed the Special 
Courts a measure of independence unheard of within any other judicial 
institutions in the world.152 In this regard, the Special Courts were 
unique in their ability to avoid the influence of other policy makers 
within the domestic governmental system, a common problem that any 
typical judicial institution in the world has, no matter how “independent” 
it is.153  As a result of this budgetary autonomy, the Special Courts were 
free to actively work for and promote their political policy objectives, 
free from any government influence or input.
151. See War Crimes Law No. 67/2003, supra note 135, art. 20; Organized Crime Law
No. 42/2002, supra note 136, arts. 20–21. 
152. Interview with Sam Nazzaro, Resident Legal Advisor, U.S. Embassy, Belgrade, in 
Belgrade, Serbia (Dec. 8, 2004). 
153. For a small sampling of the vast literature on this point, see, for example, 
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (where the author claimed that, in the U.S., the 
courts generally supported and upheld the major policies of the dominant national 
alliance); Martin Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 K.Y. L.J. 294 (1964) (where the 
courts are described as part of the apparatus of the state); BRUCE ACKERMAN: WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (Harv. Univ. Press 1993) (1991) (where the author describes the
state of affairs in the U.S. as a “constitutional regime” where the legislative and executive
branches, together with the courts, political parties, and voters form a matrix in which 
constitutional decisions are adjudicated); Shannon Ishiyama Smithey & John Ishiyama, 
Judicial Activism in Post-Communist Politics, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (2002) (where
the authors describe a matrix of institutional factors that affect the relative “independence” of
courts); MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 1 (2003) (where the author 
presents an argument, similar to that of Ackerman, which states that courts form a part of 
a wider “regime”—Tushnet defines a “regime” as “a reasonably stable set of institutions
through which a nation’s fundamental decisions are made over a sustained period, and 
the principles that guide those decisions”).
210
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B. The Public Policy Objectives of the Special Courts 
The Special Courts for War Crimes and Organized Crime answered to 
a different constituency than the Government of Serbia. Far from
answering to the voting-age population of Serbia or the mafia-dominated
security services, as the Serbian Government did, the Special Courts, by
virtue of their near complete structural autonomy from the Government
of Serbia, increasingly relied on the international community for financial 
support, and the ICTY or independent initiative for cases.  Traditionally,
the degree of independence, or lack thereof, of judicial institutions can
be understood as a result of the amount of such independence the 
“elected” agencies of government are willing to accept.154  In this context,
it is cooperation not competition that drives the relationship.155 This
cooperation, however, is born out of a commonality of interests, an ideal 
that is shattered when structural autonomy breeds competition amongst 
co-equal actors. 
The Special Courts were completely autonomous, and as such, the 
different public policy conclusions reached by the Special Courts, versus 
those reached by the Government of Serbia, were, above all, an
institutional phenomenon based on the constituencies the parties were
associated with.  In the case of the Government of Serbia, it was the
pressure exerted upon it by the mafia-dominated state security services
that resulted in the Government striking a strategic transitional justice 
pact with said security services, pledging not to forcibly extradite
anyone to the ICTY in exchange for voluntary cooperation.156  In the  
case of the Special Courts, on the other hand, it was the will of the
international community and the ICTY that colored their actions.  The 
motivations at work here were purely structural.  During this period of 
time, the Government of Serbia did not solely consist of reactionaries
who viewed ICTY indictees as Serbian heroes, and the powerful Serbian
organized crime gangs that continued to exert an unhealthy influence 
over the state as not to be tampered with. In much the same vein, the 
154. See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 67–76 (2003) (where the author describes courts as “strategic” 
actors looking to “dialogue” with the elected branches in an effort to maximize their power);
Keith E. Whittington, Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic Environment of Judicial
Review, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 446 (2003). 
155. Whittington, supra note 154, at 446. 
156. See supra Part III.C. 
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staff and personnel of the Special Courts did not solely consist of 
western-oriented liberals who wanted to see perceived war criminals,
and the mafia that harbored them, brought to justice.  The motivations 
were instead based purely more on structural factors.  At the time, one
could find many western oriented technocrats within the Government of 
Serbia, such as deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus, who in theory
believed in full ICTY cooperation, but accepted that the current political 
climate in Serbia did not allow for this.157 Along the same vein, within
the highest levels of the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office, one could find 
people like Special Prosecutor Vladimir Vuckčević, who was by all 
accounts doing an excellent job at his post, but who was also well-
known as the prosecutor who, in the late 1990s, tried to cover up the 
Milošević Regime’s role in the infamous “Grmec” case in which eleven
people were killed in a 1995 factory explosion involving the illegal 
production of rocket fuel by Regime-supported mafia groups.
1. Pursuit of Objectives by the Special Court for War Crimes,         
Counter by Government of Serbia 
The War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office and the Special Court for War 
Crimes pursued their objective of opposing the Government of Serbia’s 
stance on ICTY cooperation by actively coordinating with the ICTY on
the initiation of the process of extradition for Serbian citizens indicted
by the Tribunal.  The Government of Serbia countered with tactics of its 
own, increasing public distrust of both institutions. 
a. Attempted Government Sabotage of the Day-to-Day Activities of the 
Special Court for War Crimes (The “Ovčara” Trial) 
Up until the close of 2005, there was only one trial, the so-called
“Ovčara” trial, before the Special Court for War Crimes.  The trial
concerned the actions that took place outside of the Ovčara farms, on the 
outskirts of the Croatian town of Vukovar, at the close of the battle for 
the town in 1991.158  At the end of the battle, some two hundred Croatian 
civilians, many of them patients from Vukovar’s hospital, were tortured 
and later executed by Serbian military and para-military forces.  The 
case was originally transferred to the Special Court from the ICTY in the 
investigative stage, with the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office then
157. Labus: Cooperation with ICTY Should Move Forward By the End of the Year, 
V.I.P. DAILY NEWS REPORT, Nov. 23, 2004. 
158. Vukovar is a small town in the region of Croatia known as Slavonia.  For many
years this region was primarily inhabited by Serbs.  Slavonia was the scene of fierce, 
often brutal fighting during the Yugoslav civil war. 
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expanding the investigation.159  The result was an initial indictment of 
eight persons in December 2003 for violations of the laws of war.  The 
trial opened in March 2004 against six defendants.  Soon thereafter, in 
May 2004, new indictments were raised against twelve more defendants.
By the end of 2005, there were seventeen defendants standing trial in the 
Special Court. The majority of these defendants were Serbs that were
members of either the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), 
or the Vukovar Territorial Defense Force (a militia comprising the Serb
residents of Vukovar).
The Government of Serbia was relentless in applying pressure on the 
Special Court during the “Ovčara” trial.  Actively seeking to conceal the 
truth, the Government pressured the prosecution into shifting the blame
for the actions that took place at the Ovčara farms not on the JNA, 
whose officer corps during the 2000–2005 period continued to be
dominated by (ICTY) indicted war criminals, but rather on the Vukovar 
Territorial Defense Force.160  Up until former JNA members began to
give evidence, the trial focused solely on determining what each of the
defendants were doing the day the victims were taken from the Vukovar 
Hospital to the Ovčara farms under JNA escort.161  A clearly intimidated
prosecution team strenuously avoided posing any questions about JNA 
officers and the events precipitating the transfer of the victims from 
Vukovar Hospital to the Ovčara farms.162  In contrast to the affected 
prosecution, the presiding Special Court judge, Vesko Krstajić, refused 
to be intimidated and sought to establish the truth of the JNA’s actions in 
Ovčara. When JNA members took the stand to give evidence, Judge 
Krstajić was persistent in establishing what they did and what they 
omitted to do in the face of the clear intention of the Vukovar Territorial 
Defense to execute the prisoners. It was only through the persistent 
questioning of Judge Krstajić that the JNA’s role in the planning and
premeditation of the crimes committed at the Ovčara farms was
established. 
159. For more insight into the process whereby the ICTY can transfer some of its 
cases to the Special Court for War Crimes, see supra Part V.A.1. 
160. Interview with Confidential Source, in Belgrade, Serbia (Jan. 9, 2005). 
161. The JNA was mentioned only in the context of establishing whether the buses 
used to transport the prisoners were civilian or military vehicles. 
162. No questions were posed, for example, regarding the JNA barracks, to which 
the victims were briefly brought before they were transported to the Ovčara farms.
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b. Attempted Government Sabotage of the Day-to-Day Activities of the 
Special Court for War Crimes (The “Hadžić” Affair) 
Between 2003 and 2005, when the ICTY issued an indictment against
a Serbian citizen, the usual procedural process involved the indictment
being first delivered to the State-Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
then delivered to one of the investigative magistrates of the Special
Court for War Crimes. The investigative magistrate would issue an order 
for the indicted party to appear, but it was up to the Ministry of Interior 
(MuP) to enforce that order; inevitably this was never done.163  This lack
of cooperation led to competition in the media as each side issued
condemnation of the other.164  At times, the competition between the two 
agencies went beyond the trading of barbs in the newspapers and turned 
into truly destabilizing behavior. A typical case in point was that of 
ICTY indictee Goran Hadžić.165 On July 13, 2004 at 9:30 a.m., the ICTY
delivered the indictment for Hadžić to the State-Union Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.166  At approximately 3:00 p.m., six hours after its initial
delivery, the State-Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs forwarded 
Hadžić’s indictment to investigative magistrate Miroslav Alimpić of the 
Special Court for War Crimes.167  At approximately 4:29 p.m. Hadžić
was photographed by U.N. War Crimes Investigators168 leaving his villa 
with a travel bag.169  Hadžić has never been seen again.  It seems someone
in the Serbian Government tipped off Hadžić. Suspicion naturally
centered on the State-Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which sat on
the indictment for six full hours, and the Ministry of Interior (MuP),
which would have been tasked with arresting Hadžić. Both of these 
institutions, however, immediately accused the Special Court for War
Crimes of tipping off Hadžić.170  The end result was a war of words that
played out for several weeks, in which various government officials and 
ministries tried to pin the entire affair upon the Special Court for War 
Crimes.  What was happening could be seen as an attempt by the 
163. Interview with Confidential Source, in Belgrade, Serbia (Oct. 1, 2004). 
164. See Court: Police Not Following Orders, Fail to Arrest Hague Indictees, 
V.I.P. DAILY NEWS REPORT, Oct. 28, 2004. 
165. Hadžić, a wartime leader of the self-declared breakaway Serb republic of 
Krajina, had been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the 1992–
1993 conflict in Croatia. 
166. Marlise Simons, Tribunal Detectives Pursue War Criminals in the Balkans, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2004, at 3. 
167. Interview with Andrea Simić, Resident Legal Advisor Assistant, U.S. Embassy,
Belgrade, in Belgrade, Serbia (Dec. 8, 2004). 
168. U.N. War Crimes Investigators have no right to arrest fugitives, only monitor
their movements. See Simons, supra note 166. 
169. Id. 
170. Interview with Andrea Simić, supra note 167. 
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Government of Serbia to sever the tie of the Special Court for War 
Crimes with its constituencies in the international community and ICTY.
Whether the Government was successful in doing this is debatable; what
is not debatable is the damage that was done to its own institutional 
stability in the process.171 
c. Attempted Government Sabotage of the Legislative Foundation  
of the Special Court for War Crimes
The special legislation authorizing the Special Court for War Crimes
and the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office (the Special Court for War
Crimes independent Prosecutor’s Office)172 was adopted in July 2003.
The legislation served as the legal framework for the investigation, 
prosecution, and adjudication of war crimes cases committed within the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia. 
In the fall of 2004, as the result of concerted international pressure, the 
Ministry of Justice established a working group of eminent legal
scholars and practitioners, including representatives from the Special
Court itself,173 to examine the legislation one year after its ratification, 
and propose amendments to enhance its efficiency.  The working group 
met twice in November of 2004 and adopted a comprehensive series of 
amendments designed to facilitate the efficient prosecution of war
crimes cases in the Republic of Serbia. 
Due to pressure from the Ministry of Justice, the Serbian Parliament
passed only a partial list of the working group’s amendments, completely 
ignoring those proposals designed to effectively enhance the ability of 
the Special Court to do its work, the intent being to attempt to damage
the Special Court via a concerted assault on its legislative framework.
Specifically, the working groups proposed amendments  to set stringent
criteria for judicial appointments to the Special Court;174 and its amendment 
171. To date, Hadžić is still at large and, along with Ratko Mladić, is the only ICTY 
indictee still not in the custody of the Tribunal. 
172. See supra Part IV.B.1.
173. The working group was comprised of the following five members: Dr. Goran 
Illić, Professor of Law, Belgrade University School of Law; Judge Siniša Vazić, 
President of the Special Court for War Crimes; Mr. Bogdan Stanković, deputy Special 
Prosecutor War Crimes; Mr. Branko Nikolić, Legal Advisor to the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Mr. Branko Cosić, observer representing 
the Ministry of Justice. 
174. The proposed criteria being twelve years experience with criminal cases, 
professionalism and diligence, for appointment as the President of the Special Court for
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requiring the “consent” of the Special Prosecutor for War Crimes in the
appointment of the Head of the Special Police for War Crimes (as 
opposed to his “opinion”), were rejected. 
2. Pursuit of Objectives by the Special Court for Organized Crime, 
Counter by Government of Serbia 
The Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office and the Special Court for 
Organized Crime pursued their objective of opposing the Government of
Serbia’s stance on ICTY cooperation, and the understanding reached
between the Government of Serbia and the organized crime-dominated
security services, by actively investigating and indicting suspected mafia
and organized criminals (the majority of whom had ties to the profiteering
and criminality that was actively initiated during the Milošević Regime
and continued throughout the 2000–2005 period).  The Government of
Serbia countered with tactics of its own, designed to hinder the work of 
the Special Court. 
a. The “Đinđić” Trial 
At the close of 2005 there were fourteen cases before the Special 
Court for Organized Crime, with many more under investigation.  The 
most notable case was the trial of the alleged assassins of the late
Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić. The initial indictment was raised
against some forty-four persons in August 2003.  Eventually the trial 
was severed in two, with the fifteen most senior defendants (including
JSO Commander Legija)175 charged directly with the assassination of the
late Prime Minister.176  The trial commenced in December 2003, with the
main defendant, Legija, still at large.  The Government’s clear vision for the
trial was not a rational search for the truth behind the assassination of a 
Prime Minister by the security services he tried to face down, but rather
a showpiece designed to exonerate the same mafia-dominated security
services. The Government was determined not to make the same mistake
as the late Prime Minister and provoke the organized crime elements
within the security services.177  Such concerns for institutional stability, 
however, did not characterize the actions of the Special Court for
Organized Crime.  No longer embedded within the domestic political
War Crimes; and ten years experience with criminal cases, professionalism and diligence, for
appointment as a Judge in the Special Court for War Crimes. 
175. See supra Part III.B.2.
176. As opposed to the remaining defendants who were held on lesser charges such
as conspiracy, murder, and kidnapping. 
177. Interview with Confidential Source, supra note 163. 
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process by virtue of its autonomy, the Special Court sought to establish 
the truth behind the Prime Minister’s assassination. The result was
conflict, as the Government sought to immunize the damage caused by
the Special Court’s uncontrolled actions.
Government interference with the judicial processes of the trial began
at the very onset.  In one of his first interviews to the press, newly
appointed Interior Minister Dragan Jočić cast doubts upon the entire 
investigation into the assassination, questioning the professionalism of
the Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime.178  Trading barbs in the
press was put aside in favor of direct intimidation when, on April 20, 
2004, trial proceedings were interrupted by about a half-dozen men
appearing in the courtroom wearing t-shirts bearing the emblem of the 
disbanded JSO (a snarling wolf’s head).  The men observed the proceedings 
and left after the first adjournment, but not before intimidating witness 
Milan Veruović.179  It was later established that the men were in fact 
former members of the JSO and current active duty members of 
the Gendarmerie.180 Given that only one month before, one of the
prosecution’s main witnesses, Kujo Krijestorac, had been murdered,181 
the intimidating presence of the former JSO and current Gendarmerie
members in the courtroom was a clear message from the security 
services. This message was later echoed by Interior Minister Jočić when, 
instead of taking action against the men, he defended the wartime record
of the JSO, and dismissed the characterization of the young men’s 
appearance at the trial as a conspiracy.182 
178. See Dragan Jočić: Nova istraga ubistva Đinđića, BLIC, Apr. 10, 2004. The 
Minister of Interior was quoted as giving the following statement: “The police will 
simply have to reinvestigate everything concerning Đindić’s murder.  Down to every
detail.  I wouldn’t confine myself to the trial itself . . .  The [Special] Prosecutor’s task is
to dig deep and set the police on the right course, that of the police to do their job 
thoroughly . . .  I’m also puzzled by the fact that the proceedings have dragged on for so 
long. They have degenerated into something that shouldn’t be allowed to go on and on.” 
Id.
 179. Veruović told reporters afterwards that he took the appearance of the men as a 
form of pressure: “I took it as indicating that they are still out there. They existed before 
my testimony and they will continue in existence after it.” L. Čolić & D. Gavrilović, 
Skandal traži odgovornost, GLAS JAVNOSTI, Apr. 22, 2004. 
180. Milan Veruović: Pretio Mi Zvedan Jovanović, DANAS , Apr. 26, 2004. 
181. According to police reports, Krijestorac was killed late at night as he was
parking his car. The murder weapon was a pistol fitted with a silencer.  See Z. Uskoković, 
Jedno oružje, a dva motiva, VECERNJE NOVOSTI, Mar. 10, 2004. 
182. See ‘Beretke’ još funkcionišu kao ‘vučji čopor’, BLIC, Apr. 24, 2004. The 
Minister of Interior was quoted as giving the following statement: “[T]he trial is open to
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The surprise “surrender” of the main defendant of the trial, former 
JSO Commander Legija, provided the Government with further opportunity
to manipulate its proceedings.  On May 2, 2004, at approximately 9:00 
p.m., after nearly fourteen months on the run, Legija calmly approached
the Gendarmes guarding his home and surrendered.  Reports later surfaced 
that he decided to surrender to the Gendarmerie because he knew that he 
could trust them, as his old friend Goran “Guri” Radosavljević commanded 
it, and it was composed mostly of his old men from the JSO.183  Over the
next several hours Legija allegedly met in private with Interior Minister 
Jočić and his deputy, Public Security Department Head Miroslav
Milošević (another old friend).184  Reportedly, it was during these meetings
that it was decided what testimony Legija would give at the trial in order 
to deflect the blame of Prime Minister Đinđić’s assassination away from 
the mafia-controlled security services.185  In his subsequent testimony
before the Special Court,186 Legija tried to point the finger of blame on
Prime Minister Đinđić’s assassination on former cabinet ministers and
MI6 (The British Secret Service), never once mentioning the Serbian 
state security services or the organized criminal groups that dominated 
them. 
As the trial progressed, and more and more evidence came to light 
detailing the iron grip of power organized criminal groups held over both
the Serbian economy and Serbian security services, the Government
became ever more committed in its attempts to manipulate the proceedings. 
In perhaps its most brazen attempt, the Government (through Interior 
Minister Jočić and Secret Service Head Rade Bulatović) attempted to 
convince a key at large (at the time) defendant, Dejan “Bagzi” Milenković187 
to offer perjured testimony in return for immunity.188 
the public . . .  As to the t-shirts, they signify an attitude towards the unit [the JSO] and
its methods. After all, that unit earned a reputation of being unbeatable in combat during 
the war. The attitude of these young men . . . manifests a measure of attachment and
enthusiasm, so I wouldn’t call that a new conspiracy at all.”  Id. 
183. U.S. Dep’t of State, Legija Surrenders, supra note 95. 
184. Interview with Confidential Source, in Belgrade, Serbia (Feb. 28, 2005).  In
comments made to the weekly newsmagazine Vreme on Janurary 20, 2005, Miroslav 
Milošević opined that Legija probably wasn’t guilty at all and should be acquitted.  See
Dejan Anastasijević, Afere: Pravosudni udar, VREME, Jan. 20, 2005. 
185. In the words of former cabinet minister Dragan Veselinov: “Legija did not give 
himself up because he was tired and his protection fell off, but because he had a deal 
with someone in the Serbian Government. Someone is shielding him.  So far [then
Prime Minister] Koštunica himself has been the principle protector of the secret service 
chiefs . . .  Legija’s surrender to the authorities is part of a plot to scuttle the trial of Đinđić’s
murderers[.]”  Veselinov: štitnici u Vladi Srbije, DANAS, May 5, 2004. 
186. Given on June 14–16, 2004. 
187. A gangster affiliated with the Zemun Crime Gang. 
188. The sole reason the entire affair came to light is due to the fact that the Special 
Police for Organized Crime (UBPOK) were able to intercept a telephone call between
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b. Parliamentary Inquiry 
In March 2004, Serbian Parliament MP Željko Ivanji, a prominent 
leader of the G17 Plus political party (a key member of the ruling 
Government coalition), told the media that his party would propose the 
establishment of a “Committee of Inquiry” to analyze the actions of the 
Special Court for Organized Crime in investigating Prime Minister
Đinđić’s assassination.189 According to Ivanji, the purpose of the
Committee would not be to “undermine” the actions of the Special
Court, but rather to clear the reputations of any members of the state
security services the Special Court had “unwittingly” besmirched.190 
Due to political infighting between the parties composing the ruling 
Government coalition, the proposed Committee was never established,191 
but its attempted establishment, however, represented another serious 
attempt by the Government of Serbia to bring the structurally
autonomous Special Court for Organized Crime under some form of 
governmental oversight.  The episode was important not because of what
Parliament set out to do—given the Special Court’s structural autonomy
and budgetary independence there was little if any action the proposed
“Committee of Inquiry” could have taken against it—rather the episode 
was important because it highlighted the pull and hold the state security 
establishment had over the executive institutions of the state.192 By
Bagzi and his attorney, Biljana Kajganić, in which the offer was made.  In the conversation
attorney Kajganić advised her client that she made a deal with the “old buddies,” ensuring that
Bagzi would be given immunity in exchange for offering perjured testimony.  Attorney
Kajganić went on to tell Bagzi that Interior Minister Jočić had immediately accepted the 
deal, while Secret Services Head Bulatović had to first consult with “those above him”
before he could also accept the offer.  The only condition for obtaining immunity would 
be for Bagzi to say that he had organized a murder pursuant to the order of Ljubiša Buha 
Čume (Čume was one of the prosecution’s key witnesses in the trial, and this would 
discredit his testimony).  Responding to Bagzi’s reluctance to state something that was 
not true, his attorney told him the following: “Who asks you what is the truth? The truth 
is what I agreed to be the truth.  Hey, these two guys are the most powerful people in this 
state, you fool!”  Interview with Confidential Source, in Belgrade, Serbia (Sept. 15, 2004). 
Subsequently news of this affair was leaked to the media, and transcripts of the intercepted
telephone call appeared in the weekly newsmagazine Vreme. See Miloš Vasić, Prisluškivanje 
Dejana Milenkovića Bagzija: Saradnici, advokati i stari drugari, VREME, Sept. 9, 2004.
189. The mandate proposed for this Committee was quite broad, and would have
granted it the authority to look into the investigations of murders committed before and
after October 5, 2000.” See Recite Ljudi istine, VECERNJE NOVOSTI, Mar. 10, 2004. 
190. Id.
191. See V. Nikolić, Istraga i “sablja” na proveri, GLAS JAVNOSTI, Mar. 10, 2004. 
192. In the words of one observer, the proposed “Committee of Inquiry” was little 
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acting against the interests of the established stakeholders within the system, 
the Special Court for Organized Crime was provoking them into action.
VI. TESTING THE SERBIAN CASE
Having now gone over, in precise detail, the Serbian case of 
transitional justice (c. 2000–2005), we can begin to attempt to test the 
new case against the empirical findings that were revealed in Part II
above, i.e. that the existence, or lack thereof, of clear transitional justice 
pacts during the initial stages of transition directly affect the success or
failure of transitional justice. To begin, let us fit the Serbian case into 
the typology presented at the close of Part II above. 
FIGURE 2: A TYPOLOGY OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE EPISODES


























Key: Spain  = 1975-1979 
Argentina (1) = 1983-1987 
Argentina (1.5) = 1987-2003 
Argentina (2) = 2003-present 
Chile (1) = 1989-1999 
Chile (2)  = 1999-present 
South Africa = 1991-present 
Rwanda = 1994-present 
Serbia (Special Courts) = 2000-2005 
Serbia (Gov’t as a Whole = 2000-2005 
more than a “plant foisted by the Secret Service (BIA) and State Security Service (RDB)
on inexperienced people, such as those from G17 Plus [i.e. Željko Ivanji].” See id.
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It is only when the Serbian case is fitted into the typology that its truly
unique characteristics are revealed.  The Serbian case cannot be treated
as one case and must instead be split into two.  Due to their unique
structural autonomy vis-à-vis the Serbian Government, the Special 
Courts must be considered as a separate case from the Serbian 
Government. Consider how the transitional justice pact negotiated
between the security services and the Serbian Government had no 
bearing on the Special Courts.  As structurally autonomous institutions
answering to constituencies different from the Government of Serbia, the 
Special Courts were able to pursue their own objectives independent 
from the pact struck between the Government and the security services.
Despite the unique nature of the Serbian case, however, the empirical
findings that were revealed in Part II above still hold true, namely that 
the existence, or lack thereof, of clear transitional justice pacts during 
the initial stages of transition directly affect the success or failure of 
transitional justice. The transitional justice process undertaken by the
Serbian Special Courts were a complete failure. At every turn, the Special
Courts found their actions vigorously opposed by both the Serbian
Government and the security services.
The importance of these findings reverberate beyond the unique 
Serbian case and instead rather point to a need to move beyond the
current simplistic assumptions within the Law and Political Science
literature on the role of courts and judicial institutions in democratic 
transitions.  Within the literature the generally positive effect of independent 
judicial institutions on democratic development is accepted as given, and 
distinctions are constantly presented between the relative “strengths” of
the institutions of emergent democratic states.  These states have either
“strong” or “weak” institutions.  “Weak” institutions, it is deduced, produce
instability and prevent the emergence of a stable democratic polity.  The 
assumption is then presented that the institutionalization of the Rule of
Law193 will strengthen “weak” institutions by helping the new democratic
state: (1) initiate a clear break with the past; and (2) develop a legal
culture which will impress upon state actors the idea that the defined
legal bounds of the system (whatever they may be), are sacrosanct and 
193. I.e. establishing and maintaining the submission of the state to clearly defined 
rules and parameters that are applicable to all parties, regardless of status.
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cannot be transgressed.194  Independent judicial institutions are judged as
key actors in the institutionalization of the Rule of Law.195  Where the 
existing literature falls short is in its assumption that the contrast
between institutions in newly emergent democracies is always one based
on their relative “strengths.” If institutions are “weak,” they need only
be made stronger via the institutionalization of the Rule of Law through,
in part, an independent judiciary.196  Such a simplified account however
may not always explain why democracy consolidates itself in some
places and not in others.  There can be much more to institutions than 
relatively simple classifications of “strength” and “weakness.”
Is an alternative conceptualization possible?  A few scholars, most
notably Owen M. Fiss, have begun to question whether such faith on
judicial independence, at the expense of analyzing other factors into the 
equation, is perhaps misplaced.  As Fiss explains it, in conducting their 
analysis, scholars “insist that the judiciary be independent of other 
government institutions,” but fail to grasp that the judiciary itself “is part 
of the state, exercising the state’s coercive power and dedicated to
fulfilling the state’s purpose.”197  The concept of judicial independence 
then is a bit of a misnomer, for the courts themselves are part of the state
apparatus. Once one begins to envision this new understanding of where 
courts stand in relation to the other institutions of the state, the 
conception of unqualified judicial independence as a singular guarantor 
of democracy becomes more problematic: 
Political insularity enables the judiciary to act as a countervailing force within
the larger governmental system.  In the context of a dictatorship, conflict or the 
very possibility of conflict between the judiciary (if it is allowed to exist) and
the ruling powers is all to the good—the more political insularity the better. The 
situation is more complicated, however, when the judiciary is part of a 
democratic regime.  Then, so I will argue, we must optimize rather than maximize 
independence.  In contrast to impartiality, it is simply not true that the more insularity
the better, for a judiciary that is insulated from the popularly controlled institutions
of government—the legislative and executive branches—has the power to interfere
194. See generally Alejandro M. Garo, Nine Years Transition to Democracy  in
Argentina: Partial Failure or Qualified Success?, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 102 
(1993); R.F. Utter & D.C. Lundsgaard, Judicial Review in the New Nations of Central 
and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts From a Comparative Perspective, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
559 (1993); Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A 
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (1996); A.P. Melone, The
Struggle for Judicial Independence and the Transition Towards Democracy in Bulgaria, 
29 COMMUN. & POST-COMMUN. STUD. 231 (1996).
195. See e.g.  EDWARD SCHNEIER, CRAFTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES: THE
POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 199–220 (Rowan & Littlefield 2006). 
196. Id.
197. Owen M. Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 56 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993). See also
supra notes 153–155. 
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with the actions or decisions of those institutions, and thus has the power to
frustrate the will of the people.  An independent judiciary can be a threat to
democracy.198 
In the view of Fiss then, far from guaranteeing democracy, unqualified
judicial independence can act as a threat to democracy.  The independence
of judicial institutions then constitutes a true quandary, for complete
independence can create a direct threat to democracy, but at the same
time a complete lack of independence gives one courts that are 
completely subservient to the other political actors within the system.
Such an extreme in the opposite direction is problematic in of itself 
because it leaves a situation with no mechanism at all to hold political 
actors accountable. One way to overcome this conundrum of balancing 
between judicial institutions with too much independence on the one 
hand, and too little on the other, is to shift focus onto the larger idea of 
judicial autonomy as opposed to qualified versus unqualified judicial 
independence. Fiss himself seemingly takes the first steps towards
making this distinction in his call to “optimize rather than maximize” the 
idea of judicial independence in relation to democratic stability, and his
understanding of courts themselves as part of the apparatus of the state. 
The distinction between judicial impartiality (seen as a positive force) 
and judicial insularity (seen as a negative force) Fiss makes are, if taken
one step further to their most logical conclusion, the start of an analysis 
that seeks to separate the idea of judicial independence from that of
judicial autonomy. 
The idea of separating the concept of judicial independence from that
of judicial autonomy is a new one.  Indeed, as a survey of current and 
past scholarship reveals, quite often the two concepts have been considered
as one in the same and thus interchangeable at will.199  In reality however,
198. Id. 
199. See e.g., Felipe Saez Garcia, The Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America 
and Some Strategic Considerations, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1267, 1286 (1998) (Where 
the author defines “judicial independence” as a function of the degree of “judicial
autonomy” a court /judicial body possesses); Shannon Ishiyama Smithey & John Ishiyama, 
Judicious Choices: Designing Courts in Post-Communist Politics, 33 COMMUN. & POST-
COMMUN. STUD. 163, 165 (2000) (where the authors created a conceptualization of
judicial independence that had as its key aspect the notion of “political insularity”); Pilar
Domingo, Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court of Mexico, 32 J.
LAT. AM. STUD. 705, 734 (2000) (where the author uses the term “judicial autonomy” to 
explain the recent political reforms that have enabled the Supreme Court of Mexico to
emerge from the shadow of the executive branch and demonstrate an independent 
decision making function); Brian J.M. Quinn, Vietnam’s Continuing Legal Reform: 
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as Fiss began to make clear in his distinction between judicial
impartiality and judicial insularity, the two concepts refer to very
different ideas. Judicial independence refers to the idea of a judiciary 
that is impartial in its decision making, has its decisions respected by the 
other institutional actors within the system, and is free from interference 
from said institutional actors.200  Judicial autonomy, on the other hand,
refers to the degree to which a judiciary is embedded within a larger 
governmental structure.  The more embedded a judiciary is, the more 
interdependent it is on the other branches or agencies of government in 
order to function.  Under this understanding, one can see how the federal
judiciary in the United States could be characterized as both highly
independent and not at all autonomous.  The federal judiciary in the
United States is independent because its decision making is not visibly
tilted towards one set of interests or actors over others, its decisions are 
respected and enforced by the other institutional actors within the system,
and the other institutional actors within the system cannot interfere in
said decision making.  The federal judiciary in the United States is not at
all autonomous because it is a part of the larger governmental structure
and is inter-dependent upon said structures.  The federal judiciary in the 
United States must engage in cooperation with the other branches of
government in order to function—in this sense it is not an autonomous 
body. In the words of scholar John Ferejohn:
The forms of institutional dependence of the judiciary in the United States are
myriad: the Constitution gives Congress the authority to create (or not create)
federal courts other than the Supreme Court, to create and regulate their jurisdictions,
to decide how many federal judges there will be and how many will sit on each
federal court, to appropriate funds for the courts, to enact rules of court procedure, to
create alternative systems of courts under Articles I and IV, to insulate state 
court decisions from review, and of course to override certain kinds of judicial 
decisions.  The President is given the authority to appoint judges (with Senatorial
approval), to set part of the courts’ agenda (by deciding which cases to bring
and how to pursue them), and to execute (fully or not) court rulings.201 
Judicial autonomy then is a direct measurement of the degree of 
collaboration from the other branches or agencies of government the 
judiciary requires in order to function.  For the purposes of the main
Gaining Control Over the Courts, 4 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 355, 375 (2003)
(where the author interchanges and lumps together the terms “judicial independence” and
“judicial autonomy” in describing the attempts of the lower provincial courts in Vietnam to
resist attempts by the Supreme Court in Hanoi to assert more control over their functions). 
200. Larkins, supra note 194, at 608–12; Matthew Stephenson, Judicial Independence:
What It Is, How It Can Be Measured, Why It Occurs, http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/ 
legal/judicialindependence.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2009). 
201. John Ferejohn, Dynamics of Judicial Independence: Independent Judges, Dependent 
Judiciary, http://www.usc.edu/dept/law/symposia/judicial/pdf/ferejohn.pdf (last visited
Sept. 21, 2009). 
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themes and issues explored in this Article, the existence of a transitional
justice pact can be seen as one indication that the judicial actors (as part
of the larger state apparatus as a whole) are wedded to the same public
policy goals as the other institutions of the state.  Where transitional 
justice pacts either do not exist; or where through a unique convergence
of political space and institutional design judicial actors achieve a form
of judicial autonomy that allows them to ignore the prerogatives of the 
other institutions of the state, a situation emerges where the balance 
between the need for justice and the desire for stability cannot be met— 
the end result then being a situation where both justice and stability
suffer. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Through a review of the key transitional justice episodes around the 
world since the 1970s, a typology (underlining the various mechanisms 
of transitional justice available for transitioning states) was fashioned. 
This typology revealed an important empirical finding, i.e. that the 
existence, or lack thereof, of clear transitional justice pacts during the
initial stages of transition directly affect the success or failure of 
the forthcoming transitional justice process.  The type of specific legal 
institution tasked with putting the transitional justice mechanism into
action did not particularly matter (in measuring the overall success or
failure of the process), as long as a transitional justice pact between the 
various groups involved in the transition was in place.  When applied to
the unique case of transitional justice in Serbia during the 2000–2005 
period, the empirical finding highlighted the importance of the existence of
a transitional justice pact to the success of transitional justice in a
specific context held true.  The Serbian case further highlighted how the
current assumptions within the Law and Political Science literature on 
the role of courts and judicial institutions generally in democratic
transitions, need to be rethought in a way that begins to make the 
distinction between the inter-related yet different concepts of judicial 
independence and judicial autonomy.  Transitional justice pacts help 
ensure that the balance between the need for justice and the desire for
stability in any transitional justice situation are met. The existence,
during the initial delicate stages of a transition, of a clear common 
understanding as to the procedures and extent to which transitional 
justice will be undertaken, helps ensure that neither party will take the 
process beyond that which is acceptable to the other. 
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